Michael L. Hertzberg

Declaration of Michael Lee Hertzberg (September 20, 1999)

September 20, 1999 by Clerk1

Gerald L. Chaleff, SBN 39552
ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
777 South Figueroa Street, Suite 3200
Los Angeles, California 90017-5832
Telephone: (213) 629-2020

William. T. Drescher, SBN 93737
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM T. DRESCHER
PMB 338
23679 Calabasas Road
Calabasas, California 93102-1502
Telephone: (818) 349-8100
Attorneys for Non-Party
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

Samuel D. Rosen, pro hac vice
PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER LLP
399 Park Avenue, 3 1 st Floor
New York, New York 10022-4697
Telephone: (212) 318-6000

Alan K. Steinbrecher, SBN 79201
PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER LLP
555 South Flower Street, 23rd Floor
Los Angeles, California 90071-2371
Telephone: (213) 683-6000
Attorneys for Non-Party
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

LARRY WOLLERSHEIM,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF
CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.
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) Case No. C 332 027

DECLARATION OF
MICHAEL LEE HERTZBERG¹

DATE: October 15, 1999
TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT: 24
Judge Charles W. McCoy, Jr.

I, Michael Lee Hertzberg, hereby declare and state:

1. I am an attorney, admitted to practice before the courts of New York State, the District of Columbia Bar, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. I make the following statement of my own personal knowledge, and if called to testify thereto, I could and would do so competently.

2. I was counsel of record in Aznaran v. Church of Scientology of California, et al. I was present in May of 1994 in Dallas, Texas when Vicki Aznaran settled her then pending litigation against several churches of Scientology and related organizations. I was present to provide legal advice to the representatives of the defendants who were negotiating directly with Ms. Aznaran. She was represented by her attorney, Karen MacRae of Dallas.

3. On May 19, 1994 when Ms. Aznaran settled her litigation, she executed several declarations. Annexed hereto as Exhibits A – E are true and correct copies of the declarations executed by Ms. Aznaran. Her declarations cover a wide range of subjects. The most comprehensive declaration is annexed hereto as Exhibit A. This declaration provides an overview of her experience as a litigant against churches of Scientology, tactics used by individuals litigating against churches of Scientology, specific allegations from her complaint that she formally repudiated and ordered her attorneys to withdraw, the payment of thousands of dollars to witnesses for sworn statements against the churches of Scientology, and the addition of eleven pages of one of Ms. Aznaran’s declarations by an attorney representing opponents of Scientology, Graham Berry.

4. The remaining declarations (Exhibits B – E), cover specific topics related to Ms. Aznaran’s experiences as a litigant against churches of Scientology. Specifically, these declarations cover the following topics:

– Litigation tactics by Lawrence Wollersheim and Gerry Armstrong (Exhibit B);

– A specific refutation of claims that her testimony supports the contention that Church officials have destroyed documents in litigation (Exhibit C;

– Ms. Aznaran’s knowledge regarding Stacy Young (one of Mr. Wollersheim’s witnesses) (Exhibit D);

– In this declaration Ms. Aznaran also repudiates allegations of corporate irregularities similar to those being made in the instant case (Exhibit A);

– A declaration in which Ms. Aznaran explains why she executed the other declarations and her response to what she anticipates other apostates will say about her for having revealed their tactics (Exhibit E).

5. I invite the Court’s attention to particular passages relevant to the claims at issue here. Ms. Aznaran signed her declarations in May 1994, a year after her most recent statement cited by Wollersheim in support of his motion. In one declaration Ms. Aznaran explains how witnesses have been conditioned to sign affidavits to support whatever arguments opponents of churches of Scientology wish to “prove”:

The abusive device most consistently utilized by litigants and counsel adverse to the Church occurs in connection with the filing of declarations or affidavits. It is common knowledge among the stable of disaffected ex-Scientologists who supply such sworn statements that the attorneys dictate the desired content of such testimony with the primary, often sole, purpose of presenting inflammatory accusations that prejudice the Church in the eyes of the court. In such declarations or affidavits, context, the truth, and relevance to the issues in the case are disregarded altogether. As time has passed and this technique has evolved, anti-Church litigants and their counsel have become more and more emboldened in making such declarations and affidavits because the tactic has proven to be so effective in poisoning courts and juries against the Church.

Thus, it has become a routine practice of litigants to make accusations against the Church, including even false allegations of threats of murder, which would be summarily thrown out of court as unsupported and scandalous in other litigation. There is a group or “team” of anti-Scientology witnesses who are being paid for their testimony, and based on my experience, this testimony is being altered and falsified, either by the witnesses themselves or the attorneys. (Ex. A, Declaration of Vicki Aznaran; 12, 17, 19.)

6. Ms. Aznaran even predicted that the attached declarations would be attacked by adverse litigants whose litigation tactics she has exposed:

On May 19, 1994, my husband and I each executed a series of declarations under penalty of perjury addressing a variety of issues. Among those declarations are one of mine that demonstrates that perhaps the most common litigation ploy that is used against Churches of Scientology is for opponents to submit false, inflammatory and accusatory declarations which make wild accusations irrespective of their falsity, lack of relevance, or lack of first hand knowledge.

I am executing this declaration on May 19, 1994 because I am certain that litigation opponents of the Church will react to one or more of my other contemporaneously dated declarations in precisely the fashion I describe in the preceding paragraph.

(Ex. E, Declaration of Vicki Aznaran; 2, 3.)

7. Ms. Aznaran identifies Stacy Young as employed by Graham Berry, Mr. Leipold’s former co-counsel in Wollersheim, to create inaccurate affidavits:

I know from subsequent conversations I have had that Andre Tabayoyon is similarly employed, as are Vaughn and Stacy Young and others, each paid to create declarations for Mr. Berry when he needs them. On the basis of my knowledge of the Church and the declarants, I can state that these individuals are not “experts” ‘in any recognized sense of the word as I understand it. They are nothing more than witnesses who are being paid to make sworn statements against the Church. More than just being paid, they are actually employed by Mr. Berry as a source of signed declarations of testimony or as a ” source” of allegations, the need for such is decided by him. (Ex. A, Declaration of Vicki Aznaran; 22.)

That Vaughn and Stacy Young are experts is not true. They are being called experts not due to expertise in Scientology but in order to collect insurance money for their testimony.

What this creates, and what the Youngs are part of, is a stable of people who, for pay, write declarations. (Ex. D, Declaration of Vicki Aznaran; 7, 8.)

8. Ms. Aznaran also swore to Ms. Young’s lack of knowledge of inside workings of churches of Scientology, both corporately and ecclesiastically:

In my staff capacities in the early 1980s, and later in my executive positions in the Religious Technology Center, I was directly or closely involved in meetings with senior staff members of various Church corporations. These senior staff made significant or major decisions which affected the future of the Church. I know that neither Vaughn nor Stacy Young were included in such senior decision-making processes. They were never senior or key Church executives. They were not consulted regarding, nor were they privy to, the meetings where major issues were discussed an decisions made.

I am informed that the Youngs have made claims to specialized knowledge about the corporate status and structure of the Church. Such claims are false. Neither of the Youngs were in a position to have detailed knowledge of the corporate and fiscal structures and operations of any Church of Scientology. In fact, Vaughn Young worked in the area of Public Relations for the entire time that I was acquainted with him. Stacy was primarily a writer in the Church public relations department. (Ex. D, Declaration of Vicki Aznaran; 4, 5.)

9. Ms. Aznaran repudiated allegations of corporate irregularities that were contained in her complaint against the Church of Scientology of California. These allegations are very similar to those being made by Wollersheim in the instant case:

Paragraph 16 of the complaint included the allegation that I had been employed as a “missionaire” to remove assets of Defendant Church of Scientology of California to overseas trusts where they could not be accessed. This allegation was false, and it was not an allegation that either my husband or I requested be included in the complaint….

It was also alleged in paragraph 16 of the complaint that I was employed as a”missionaire” to “set up sham corporate structures to evade prosecution generally.” This allegation is also false. (Ex. A, Declaration of Vicki Aznaran; 8, 9.)

10. In another sworn declaration Ms. Aznaran identifies Wollersheim witness Gerald Armstrong as the source of a litigation technique utilized by this small group of witnesses:

The fundamental premise upon which the Church’s adversaries and their lawyers operate is the likelihood that courts and juries are willing to believe any allegation made against the Church by a former member, without regard to plausibility, contrary evidence or the true facts. That concept was most succinctly expressed, on videotape, by anti-Scientology litigant, Gerald Armstrong, when he state that a lack of documents or evidence was no impediment to litigating against the Church when the litigant can “just allege it.” The active pursuit of that litigation approach has now led to the formation of a small group of disaffected Scientologists who are now employed by an even smaller number of attorneys who are making a practice of litigating against the Church. This stable of witnesses can be relied upon to furnish ” corroboration” for any allegation which an attorney wishes to make against the Church in pleadings, at deposition, in affidavits, and ultimately in trial testimony. (Ex. A, Declaration of Vicki Aznaran; 5.)

11. Ms. Aznaran even addressed Larry Wollersheim’s allegations:

While I was in the Church I witnessed the “Fair Game” allegations made by Gerry Armstrong and Larry Wollersheim in their litigation against the Church. My position in the church at the time gave me broad access to what was occurring and I would have known were the allegations made by Armstrong and Wollersheim true. Wollersheim, for example, made the allegation that a pipe bomb was found on his parent’s lawn and, without any corroboration, blamed the Church. I know from my own personal knowledge that this outrageous allegation of Church involvement is absolutely false. During the Wollersheim trial, rumors began to spread throughout the trial courtroom that Judge Ronald Swearinger had been followed, his tires had been slashed, and his pet dog drowned, and that the Church was responsible for that supposed activity. All of those allegations of Church complicity were false, as I now personally attest. Armstrong alleged the Church was trying to kill him and this allegation was just made up. I know of its falsity of my own personal knowledge. Both Armstrong and Wollersheim, continue to make the same type of outrageous allegations of Fair Game to forward their litigation to this day, due ‘in no small measure to the fact that they practiced Fair Game so effectively in their earlier, victorious litigation against the Church.” (Ex. B, Declaration of Vicki Aznaran; 12.)

12. An allegation relied upon by Wollersheim is that David Miscavige ordered Vicki Aznaran and Jesse Prince to destroy documents, including documents compelled to be produced in this case. However, Ms. Aznaran states in another declaration:

During the time I was President of RTC, we fully complied to all discovery requests, I have never received an order from David Miscavige, Norman Starkey or Lyman Spurlock to destro any documents related to litigation and I have no reason to believe that the Church would destroy any documents related to the consolidated cases… (Ex. C, Declaration of Vicki Aznaran; 8.)

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 20th day of September, 1999 at ______________.

MICHAEL LEE HERTZBERG

Notes

Document source: http://bernie.cncfamily.com/sc/Aznaran.htm ↩

Appellant’s Opening Brief (January 19, 1993)

January 19, 1993 by Clerk1

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FOUR

Civ. No. B 069450
(Super. Ct. No. BC 052395)

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs
GERALD ARMSTRONG,
Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal From

Superior Court Of The State Of California
County of Los Angeles

The Honorable Ronald M. Sohigian

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF¹

Ford Greene
HUB LAW OFFICES
California State Bar No. 107601
711 Sir Francis Drake Boulevard
San Anselmo, California 94960-1949
Telephone: (415) 258-0360

PAUL MORANTZ, ESQ.
P.O. Box 511
Pacific Palisades, California 90272
(213) 459-4745

Attorneys for Appellant GERALD ARMSTRONG

[…]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 4; 1992, Scientology filed its verified complaint for damages and for preliminary and permanent injunction against defendant Gerald Armstrong in Marin County Superior Court Action No. 152229. On March 30, 1992 the Marin court granted Armstrong’s motion to transfer to the Los Angeles County Superior Court where it became Action No. BC 052395. During the pendency of Scientology’s motion for injunctive relief, and in order to maintain the status quo, but specifically stating there was no adjudication on the merits, the Marin Court granted a temporary restraining order (16) ¹/ which was ultimately dissolved in Los Angeles.
On May 7, 1992, Scientology filed its Amended Memorandum of

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¹ All citations designated (___) are to the particular sequential page number of the Appendix Filed In Lieu Of Clerk’s Transcript pursuant to California Rule of Court 5.1.

Page 2. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Breach of Contract (1-29), and Armstrong filed his Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (30-50) Scientology replied on May 20, 1992. (51-63) The matter was heard on May 26 and 27, 1992 by the Honorable Ronald M. Sohigian (RT 5/26/92 and 1594-1713) who issued a preliminary injunction by his minute order dated May 28, 1992. (1714-17) Notice of ruling was given on June 5, 1992 in conjunction with the posting of a $70,000.00 bond.

Armstrong’s Notice of Appeal was timely filed on July 30, 1992. (1728-30)

STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY

Since this matter involves the granting of an injunction, it is the proper subject of an appeal. Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 (f).

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Gerald Armstrong, The Scientologist

In consequence of being a member of the Scientology Organization for 12 years, Gerald Armstrong gained first-hand knowledge regarding both the nature of the organization and the methods of its day-to-day operations. Although Armstrong ultimately learned, that L. Ron Hubbard (“LRH”) was “virtually a pathological liar when it [came] to his history, background, and achievements” (474-75, 485-89, 1004, 1008-14), at the outset of his involvement it was Hubbard’s lies which induced his affiliation. (1004-08, 1067)

Armstrong learned that after inducing the affiliation of its members by various deceptions, Scientology continually “violat[ed] and abus[ed] its own members’ civil rights, . . . with its “Fair Game” doctrine [and] harass[ed] and abuse[ed] those persons not in the Church whom it perceive[d] as enemies.” (474) The “Fair Game Policy,” a part of Scientology’s system of discipline and punishment, states:

Page 3. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

“Enemy – SP (Suppressive Person) Order. Fair Game. May be deprived of property or injured by any means by any Scientologist without any discipline of the Scientologist. May be tricked, sued or lied to or destroyed.”

(1036-1037)

Scientology also abused its members’ civil rights through breaching its promises that the personal information it extracted from adherents through “auditing” ²/ would be kept confidential. Instead, it used such information for the purposes of domination, extortion and blackmail. (734-74, 1039-41) Auditing was also employed to eliminate the members’ ability to critically reason, (1038, 1081), despite Scientology’s public claim that its purpose was to free individuals. (1086)

Armstrong possesses first-hand information regarding the visible structure of Scientology, and how the leadership ran Scientology through internal organizations, such as the Guardian’s Office, the Sea Organization and the Commodore’s Messenger Organization, which managed, operated and controlled all of Scientology regardless of any particular corporate designation. (475, 997, 1023-30, 1045-46). He knew that LRH’s representation to the general public and the Scientology membership that “the fees you pay for service do not go to me” was false and that LRH lived in splendor while the organization staff lived like slaves. (1032-34)

Armstrong participated in and drilled hundreds of people in

____
² During the process of “auditing” in Scientology, a person being “audited,” a “penitent,” communicates to the clergyman, counselor, or therapist, the “auditor,” his innermost thoughts and relates incidents from his life which are emotionally charged, embarrassing or for which he could be blackmailed. The auditor writes down what the penitent says in “auditing reports.” The auditor demands and records details such as time and place when an incident occurred, who was present, who knew about the incident, their relationship to the penitent and their address or general location. These “auditing reports” form, along with the auditor’s notes and instructions made after the auditing sessions, the penitent’s auditing files. (1081)

Page 4. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

institutionalized schemes of practiced deception called “shore stories” or “acceptable truths,” which LRH claimed were required to combat the “enemy.” (1051, 1016-19, 787-88)

Armstrong was assigned to the Intelligence Bureau of the Guardian’s Office ³/ headed by LRH and his wife and then posted as LRH’s communications aide. (996) During this time he coded and decoded Guardian’s Office telexes, and maintained LRH’s operations files including those which ordered infiltration of the federal, state and local government offices, and the theft of documents. Armstrong also handled LRH’s telexes and dispatches ordering corporate manipulations which showed an absence of corporate integrity among the Scientology organizations.(1045-46)

LRH ordered Armstrong and his wife into the Rehabilitation Project Force (“RPF”), which was “a virtual prison Hubbard had created for any Sea Org members whom he considered to be in violation of or ‘counter-intention’ (“CI”) to his orders or policies.” (997; 738; 1048-49) The purpose of the RPF was to control members, who were physically held and not free to leave, break their will and obtain free labor. (740, 1050) Armstrong was imprisoned within the RPF for 17 months on one occasion and 8 months on a second. (739, 997, 999, 1048)

Armstrong personally participated in the massive destruction of evidence ordered in anticipation of a raid by the F.B.I. during which he came across LRH’s life archive. (480-81, 485-86, 1000-01) Throughout 1980 and 1981, Armstrong assembled an
____
³ “The Guardian’s Office is charged with the protection of Scientology. The Guardians handle intelligence matters including covert operations to acquire Government documents critical of Scientology, internal security within Scientology, and covert operations to discredit and remove from positions of power all persons whom Scientology considers to be its enemies.” United States v. Heldt (1981) 668 F.2d 1238, 1247, cert. denied (1982) 102 S.Ct. 1971. The Guardian’s Office executed tremendous control throughout all of Scientology, and until 1981, was the most powerful of LRH’s two main control lines. (1023-28)

Page 5. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

archive of 500,000 pages of documentation of LRH’s life, writings and accomplishments. (1003) In October 1980, LRH contracted with an independent author, Omar V. Garrison, to write his
biography. (1004) Armstrong became Garrison’s “research assistant.” (1004; 483-85)

During his biographical research, Armstrong discovered that LRH and Scientology had continuously lied about LRH’s past, credentials and his accomplishments. (486, 1008-14) As the wide gap between LRH’s claims about himself and the reality evidenced by the documentation Armstrong had assembled became manifest, he attempted to convince Scientology executives to change the biographical materials being published and disseminated about LRH so that they would be truthful. (1004; 486-87)

In response to Armstrong’s requests that Scientology tell the truth about Hubbard, a leader ordered that Armstrong be “security checked. (487) Sec checking is a brutally accusative interrogation in which the E-Meter, the electrometer used in Scientology auditing, is employed as a lie detector and tool of intimidation. Upon learning that his sec checking had been ordered, Armstrong and Jocelyn, his wife, left Scientology. (1015)

Following Armstrong’s departure, Scientology sued him, and hired private investigators who assaulted him, ran into him bodily with a car, attempted to involve him in a freeway accident, and followed and harassed him day and night for over one month. Scientology made four attempts to bring false criminal charges against him, destroyed his marriage, used his best friend to set him up in an intelligence operation, and had its members, lawyers and private investigators make false statements against him. (1053, 492-93)

B. Scientology Sues Armstrong The First Time And Loses

On August 2, 1982, Scientology sued Armstrong in L.A.S.C. No C420153 (“Armstrong I“) for conversion of certain papers which he had archived as part of the Hubbard biography project. After a

Page 6. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

lengthy trial, Judge Paul G. Breckenridge, Jr., filed his Memorandum of Intended Decision in Armstrong’s favor on June 22f 1984. (467) Rejecting Scientology’s effort to silence Armstrong and his counsel, (see 1202-1226), he stated:

Defendant and his counsel are free to speak and communicate upon any of Defendant Armstrong’s recollections of his life as a Scientologist or the contents of any exhibit received in evidence or marked for identification and not specifically ordered sealed. . . . defendant and his counsel may discuss the contents of any documents under seal or of any matters as to which this court has found to be privileged as between the parties hereto, with any duly constituted Governmental Law Enforcement Agency or submit any exhibits or declarations thereto concerning such documents or materials, without violating any order of this court.

(469) Judge Breckenridge found the facts presented by Armstrong to be true and incorporated Armstrong’s trial brief as an appendix to its decision. (470) He characterized Scientology as malevolent, in part because the organization “or its minions is fully capable of intimidation [of witnesses, including Armstrong] or other physical or psychological abuse if it suits their ends” (474), and provided the following factual findings:

In 1970 a police agency of the French Government conducted an investigation into Scientology and concluded “this sect, under the pretext of ‘freeing humans’ is nothing in reality but a vast enterprise to extract a maximum amount of money from its adepts by (use of) pseudo-scientific theories, by (use of) ‘auditions’ and ‘stage settings’ (lit. to create a theatrical scene’) pushed to extremes (a machine to detect lies, its own particular phraseology . . ), to estrange adepts from their families and to exercise a kind of blackmail against persons who do not wish to continue with this sect.” [footnote omitted] From the evidence presented to this court in 1984, at the very least, similar conclusions can be drawn.

In addition to violating and abusing its own members civil rights, the organization over the years with its “Fair Game” doctrine has harassed and abused those persons not in the Church whom it perceives as enemies. The organization is clearly schizophrenic and paranoid, and this bizarre combination seems to be a reflection of its founder LRH [L.

Page 7. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

Ron Hubbard]. The evidence portrays a man who has been virtually a pathological liar when it comes to his history, background, and achievements. The writings and documents in evidence additionally reflect his egoism, greed, avarice, lust for power, and vindictiveness and aggressiveness against persons perceived by him to be disloyal or hostile.

(Emphasis added.) (474)

In contrast to his findings regarding Scientology, Judge Breckenridge found Armstrong and his witnesses to be credible and sympathetic. He wrote:

As indicated by its factual findings, the court finds the testimony of Gerald and Jocelyn Armstrong, Laurel Sullivan, Nancy Dincalcis, Edward Walters, Omar Garrison, Kima Douglas, and Homer Schomer to be credible, extremely persuasive and the defense of privilege or justification established and corroborated by this evidence . . . In all critical and important matters, their testimony was precise, accurate, and rang true. The picture painted by these former dedicated Scientologists, all of whom were intimately involved [with the highest echelons of power in] the Scientology Organization, is on one hand pathetic, and on the other, outrageous. Each of these persons literally gave years of his or her respective life in support of a man, LRH [L. Ron. Hubbard], and his ideas. Each has manifested a waste and loss or frustration which is incapable of description.

(Emphasis added.) (473)

C. Scientology’s Attempt To Frame Michael Flynn ⁴/

Within four months of Judge Breckenridge’s decision, Scientology engaged in a massive “black PR” campaign against Michael Flynn which included the following operation:

The recent efforts of Hubbard and his Organization include procurement through the payment of $25,000 to an individual currently under indictment for perjury and fraud, of an affidavit claiming that I assisted in the forgery of a two million dollar check belonging to L. Ron Hubbard. The affidavit was procured by one Eugene Ingram who has been removed from the Los Angeles

____
⁴ This section is based upon the Declarations of Michael J. Flynn, Armstrong’s attorney. The Court should note that said declarations, however, were excluded from evidence. The trial court was incorrect however, because said declaration were based upon the personal knowledge of Flynn.

Page 8. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

Police Department for aiding narcotics dealers, pimping, and running a house of prostitution. Mr. Ingram procured the affidavit from a citizen of the United Arab Emirates after publicizing a $100,000 reward in full page advertisements in the Boston Globe, the New York Times, and other newspapers.

(1183-84) The foregoing facts were found to be accurate in the reported decision, United States v. Kattar (5th Cir. 1988) 840 F.2d 118, 119-22.

D. Scientology’s Attempt To Frame Armstrong

In 1984, after the Breckenridge decision, Scientology also attempted to set up and frame Armstrong, to “dead agent” him. As stated by Scientology in the Miller, Aznaran, and Xanthos litigation (discussed infra.)

Gerald Armstrong has been an admitted agent provocateur of the U.S. Federal Government who planned to plant forged documents in [Scientology’s] files which would then be “found” by Federal officials in subsequent investigation as evidence of criminal activity.

(1546-50; see also (1320). He had been

“plotting against … Scientology … and seeking out staff members who would be willing to assist him in overthrowing [Scientology] leadership. [Scientology] obtained information about Armstrong’s plans and, through a police-sanctioned investigation, provided Armstrong with the “defectors” he sought. On November 30, 1984, Armstrong met with one Michael Rinder, an individual whom Armstrong thought to be one of his “agents” (but who in reality was loyal to [Scientology]). In the conversation, recorded with written permission from law enforcement, Armstrong stated the following in response to questions by Mr. Rinder as to whether they had to have actual evidence of wrongdoing to make allegations in Court against [Scientology’s] leadership:

Armstrong: They can allege it. They can allege it. They don’t even have — they can allege it.

RINDER: So they don’t even have to — like — they don’t have to have the documents sitting in front of them and then–

Armstrong: Fucking say the organization destroys documents. . . . Where are the — we don’t have to prove a goddamn thing. We don’t have to prove shit; we just have to allege it.

Page 9. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

(Ex. E, Declaration of Lynn R. Farney, ¶ 6.) With such a criminal attitude, Armstrong fits perfectly into Yanny’s game plan for the Aznaran case.”

(1353-54)

The “written permission from law enforcement” was fraudulent and made without authority. The bogus document was dated November 7, 1984 on the letterhead of Eugene Ingram. (1572)

By public announcement, Los Angeles Chief of Police, Daryl F. Gates, repudiated the “written permission.” In part, Chief Gates stated:

I have directed an official letter to Ingram informing him that the letter signed by Officer Phillip Rodriguez dated November 7, 1984, and all other letters of purported authorizations directed to him, signed by any member of the Los Angeles Police Department, are invalid and unauthorized.

(1574)

Scientology’s allegations against Armstrong were thoroughly investigated by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office and completely and soundly rejected. (1576-87)

E. The Settlement

In the Armstrong I litigation, on both the complaint and cross-complaint, Armstrong was represented by Boston attorney Michael J. Flynn, who also was Armstrong’s employer. (665) In early December 1986, an agreement was reached in Los Angeles by the Scientology Organization and Flynn to settle most of the cases in which Flynn was involved, either as counsel, or as a party. On December 5, 1986, Armstrong, along with nearly a score of other litigants adverse to Scientology – all of whom were represented by Flynn – was flown to Los Angeles to participate in a “global settlement.” (667) When Armstrong arrived in Los Angeles from Boston, he knew that settlement negotiations had been going on for months. (762) Upon Armstrong’s arrival, he was shown a copy of a document entitled “Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement” for the first time, as well as some other documents that he was expected to sign.

When Armstrong read the settlement agreement, he was shocked

Page 10. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

and heartsick. The agreement betrayed everything that Armstrong had stood for in his battle opposing Scientology. (760) He told Flynn that the condition, set forth in settlement agreement ¶ 7-D, of “strict confidentiality and silence with respect to his experiences with the [Scientology organization]” was outrageous and not capable of compliance because it involved over 17 years of his life. Armstrong told Flynn that ¶ 7-D would require him to pay $50,000 if he told a doctor or a psychologist about his experiences over those 17 years, or if he put on a job resume the positions he had held while in Scientology. He told Flynn that the requirements of non-amenability to service of process in ¶ 7-H and non-cooperation with persons or organizations adverse to the organization in ¶ ¶ 7-G and 10 were obstructive of justice. Armstrong told Flynn that agreeing in ¶ 4-B to allow Scientology’s appeal of Judge Breckenridge’s decision in Armstrong I to continue without opposition was unfair to the courts and all the people who had been helped by the decision. Armstrong said to Flynn the affidavit that Scientology demanded he sign along with the settlement agreement was false. (668, 759)

Right after Armstrong first saw the document, he was told there were a number of other people with claims against Scientology who had already signed and others were being flown in to sign. (762) Flynn told Armstrong that he, and all the other lawyers, wanted to get out of the litigation because it had ruined his marriage and his wife’s health. Flynn told Armstrong that all the other witnesses upon whom later he would have to depend wanted to settle, too.

In Flynn’s presence, Eddie Walters, another litigant adverse to Scientology, yelled at Armstrong. Walters said everybody wanted out of the litigation, that Armstrong’s objections would kill the deal for all of the them, and that Armstrong’s objections didn’t matter because the settlement was bigger than he was. (762-63) Flynn did not stick up for Armstrong. (764)

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Flynn told Armstrong if he did not sign all he had to look forward to would be more years of threats, harassment and misery from Scientology, and everybody else would be very upset. Flynn advised Armstrong that the conditions of the settlement which he found offensive “were not worth the paper they were printed on” and that Scientology’s lawyers were aware of Flynn’s legal opinion and, nonetheless, wanted such language included. (759) Flynn advised Armstrong that in the event that there was further litigation against Armstrong by Scientology, Flynn would still be there to defend him. (768) Armstrong felt “a great deal” of pressure to sign the agreement, and capitulated. (761, 765-66, 772; 670-71)

It was Armstrong’s understanding and intent at the time of the settlement that he would honor the silence and confidentiality provisions of the settlement agreement, and that Scientology would do likewise. (672)

On December 11, 1986, Flynn and Scientology attorneys John G. Peterson, Michael Lee Hertzberg and Lawrence E. Heller appeared, ex parte, before Judge Breckenridge, announced that they had settled Armstrong’s Cross-Complaint in Armstrong I (458), and submitted a number of documents for filing. (1235-36, 1238, 1240-41, 1243-45, 1247-49, 1251.) Despite its promises, Scientology never did file the settlement agreement. (1258)

When Judge Breckenridge inquired whether the agreement impacted the appeal of his decision, the attorneys said that the agreement did not (458), despite Paragraphs 4-A and 4-B. (75-76) None of the attorneys advised Judge Breckenridge of their side stipulation that any retrial of Armstrong I ordered by the Court of Appeal would limit damages claimed by Scientology to $25,001, (1253) ⁵/ and they failed to advise him there was another side

____
⁵ Said stipulation, signed by Michael Flynn on Armstrong’s behalf and by John Peterson and Michael Hertzberg for Scientology and Mary Sue Hubbard, states: “The Church of Scientology of California, Mary Sue Hubbard, and Gerald

Page 12. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

agreement between Flynn and Scientology attorneys Cooley and Heller whereby they agreed to indemnify Flynn if the Court of Appeal reversed Armstrong I and they retried the case and won. (1255-56)

Moreover, prior to and at the time of the settlement Armstrong was not aware of the side agreements between his lawyers and the lawyers for the organization that considered Gerald Armstrong as their enemy! (712-13, 715; 771-72)

On December 18, 1986, the Court of Appeal dismissed appeal No. B005912 as premature because Armstrong’s cross-complaint remained to be tried. (1260-73) ⁶/

On January 30, 1987, Scientology filed an Unopposed Motion to Withdraw Memorandum of Intended Decision in Armstrong I. (1279-83) which Judge Breckenridge denied. (1285) Scientology then filed its second appeal in Armstrong I. (1287) On July 29, 1991, the Court of Appeal affirmed Judge Breckenridge’s decision. Church of Scientology of California v. Armstrong (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1060, 283 Cal.Rptr. 917.

F. Scientology’s Post Settlement Breaches

1. The Corydon “Dead Agent” Pack

In 1987, less than one year after the agreement was signed,

____
Armstrong, by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate that in any retrial ordered by any appellate court in Church of Scientology of California v. Gerald Armstrong, LASC No. 420153, the total damages awarded to the Plaintiff Church of Scientology of California and Plaintiff in Intervention Mary Sue Hubbard, combined for any and all causes of action, shall not exceed twenty five thousand and one dollars ($25,001.00).”

⁶ The Court of Appeal would not have been advised of the resolution of the underlying Cross-Complaint in Armstrong I – on the existence of which it based its order of dismissal of the appeal – because the fate of said appeal was the subject of Paragraphs 4-A and 4-B of the secret agreement.

Page 13. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

Scientology distributed a “dead agent” ⁷/ pack which included an attack on Armstrong. It stated:

“Corydon has used a description of the RPF provided by Gerry Armstrong, among others. Armstrong’s description in this book, however, is completely contrary to his own previous sworn affidavit about the RPF. (Gerry Armstrong’s description of the RPF in Corydon’s book can also be viewed in light of Armstrong’s numerous false claims and lies on other subject matters.)”

(1504) (Emphasis added.)

2. Scientology’s Declarations In The Miller Litigation

In October, 1987, Scientology representative Kenneth Long executed five affidavits in Church of Scientology of California v. Miller, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, No. 1987 C. No. 6140, wherein Long solely discussed his characterizations of Armstrong’s activities that had been at issue in the Armstrong I litigation, and thus included within the scope of the settlement agreement. (See Appendix pp. 1506-23; 1525-44; 1546-50, 1555-62, 1564-70)

Long’s third affidavit falsely charged that:

Gerald Armstrong has been an admitted agent provocateur of the U.S. Federal Government who planned to plant forged documents in [Scientology’s] files which would then be “found” by Federal officials in subsequent investigation as evidence of criminal activity. (1549)

In another affidavit filed in the Miller case on October 5, 1987, Sheila M. Chaleff also falsely stated:

Mr. Armstrong is known to me to be a US government informant who has admitted on video tape that he intended to plant

____
⁷ “A ‘dead agent’ is a concept created by Hubbard in which an agent who is supposedly spreading stories about you, a lie, an untruth in his story is found. And that is documented. [¶] And then that documented fact is circulated to all of the people to whom the agent has communicated, and then he will become essentially dead, he will be killed by those people who have earlier trusted him. So you’ve destroyed his credibility and as an agent he is dead. [¶] And this pack of materials was a dead agent pack put out to dead agent Bent Corydon. Bent Corydon had written a book about Hubbard, and this is a pack of materials to discredit Bent Corydon.” (791)

Page 14. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

forged documents within the Church of Scientology and then using the contents to get the Church raided where these forged documents would be found and used against the Church.

(1553)

3. Heller’s Declaration And Argument In The Corydon Litigation

On or about November 1, 1989, in the case entitled Corydon v. Church of Scientology International, Inc., et al., LASC No. C694401, Scientology attorney Lawrence E. Heller filed a Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Author Services, Inc. to Delay or Prevent the Taking of Certain Third Party Depositions by Plaintiff. (1294-1305) In his memorandum, Heller discussed the “block settlement” of which the Armstrong agreement was a part:

One of the key ingredients to completing these settlements, insisted upon by all parties involved, was strict confidentiality respecting: (1) the Scientology … staff member’s experiences within … Scientology; (2) any knowledge possessed by the Scientology entities concerning those staff members …; and (3) the terms and conditions of the settlements themselves. Peace has reigned since the time the interested parties entered into the settlements, all parties having exercised good faith in carrying out the terms of the settlement, including the obligations of confidentiality. [Original emphasis.]

(1297) In his sworn declaration, attorney Heller testified:

I was personally involved in the settlements which are referred to in these moving papers which transpired some two and one-half years ago. . . . a “universal settlement” was ultimately entered into between the numerous parties. The universal settlement provided for non-disclosure of all facts underlying the litigation as well as non-disclosure of the terms of the settlements themselves. The non-disclosure obligations were a key part of the settlement agreements insisted upon by all parties involved. [Original emphasis.]

(1301-02)

4. Scientology’s Complaint Against The IRS

On August 12, 1991, Scientology filed a complaint styled Church of Scientology International v. Xanthos, et al., in United States District Court, Central District of California, No. 91-4301-SVW(Tx). (1307-47) Therein, Scientology stated:

Page 15. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

The infiltration of [Scientology] was planned as an undercover operation by the LA CID along with former [Scientology] member Gerald Armstrong, who planned to seed [Scientology] files with forged documents which the IRS could then seize in a raid. The CID actually planned to assist Armstrong in taking over the [Scientology] hierarchy which would then turn over all [Scientology] documents to the IRS for their investigation.

(1320)

5. The Aznaran Litigation

On or about August 26, 1991, Scientology filed its Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice in Aznaran v. Church of Scientology of California, et al. United States District Court, Central District of California, No. CV-88-1786-JMI(Ex). (1349¬59) Therein, a Scientology attorney stated that in 1984 Armstrong was

“plotting against … Scientology … and seeking out staff members who would be willing to assist him in overthrowing [Scientology] leadership. [Scientology] obtained information about Armstrong’s plans and, through a police-sanctioned investigation, provided Armstrong with the “defectors” he sought. On November 30, 1984, Armstrong met with one Michael Rinder, an individual whom Armstrong thought to be one of his “agents” (but who in reality was loyal to [Scientology]). In the conversation, recorded with written permission from law enforcement, Armstrong stated the following in response to questions by Mr. Rinder as to whether they had to have actual evidence of wrongdoing to make allegations in Court against [Scientology’s] leadership
• • •

(Ex. E, Declaration of Lynn R. Farney, ¶ 6.) With such a criminal attitude, Armstrong fits perfectly into Yanny’s game plan for the Aznaran case.”
(1353-54)

Armstrong was cleared by the Los Angeles District Attorney after a thorough – and Scientology generated – investigation. (1576-87)

G. Armstrong’s Post Settlement Breaches

Scientology’s position at the hearing below was that Armstrong violated paragraphs 7-G and 7-H of the settlement

Page 16. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

agreement. (81-82) The violations were predicated upon the facts that Armstrong had worked for two days in the office of Joseph A. Yanny and had executed two declarations to be filed in the Aznaran case (122-23; 128; 136-38), had later executed a declaration on Yanny’s behalf that was filed in Religious Technology Center v. Yanny, LASC No. BC 033035, (124-34), and had worked as a paralegal for Ford Greene in the Aznaran case (143
45; 159-64; 169) in which Armstrong filed another declaration on the Aznarans’ behalf. (147-57; RT 5/27/92 at 47)

[…]

Notes

This document in PDF format. ↩

CSC v. US (November 16, 1992)

November 16, 1992 by Clerk1

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

Syllabus

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA v.

UNITED STATES ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 91-946. Argued October 6, 1992-Decided November 16, 1992¹

Pursuant to its jurisdiction under 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a), the District Court ordered a state-court Clerk to comply with a summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the production of, inter alia, two tapes in the Clerk’s custody recording conversations between officials of petitioner Church of Scientology (Church) and their attorneys. Although the Church filed a timely notice of appeal, its request for a stay of the summons enforcement order was unsuccessful, and copies of the tapes were delivered to the IRS while the appeal was pending. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot, ruling that no controversy existed because the tapes had already been turned over to the IRS.

Held: Compliance with the summons enforcement order did not moot the Church’s appeal. Delivery of the tapes to the IRS did not mandate dismissal by making it impossible for the Court of Appeals to grant the Church “any effectual relief.” See Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653. Although it is now too late to prevent, or to provide a fully satisfactory remedy for, the invasion of privacy that occurred when the IRS obtained the information on the tapes, the Court of Appeals does have power to effectuate a partial remedy by ordering the Government to return or destroy any copies of the tapes that it may possess. Even if the Government is right that under §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a) the jurisdiction of the district court is limited to those matters directly related to whether or not the summons should be enforced, the question presented here is whether there was jurisdiction in the appellate court to review the allegedly unlawful summons enforcement order. There is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code to suggest that Congress sought to preclude such review, and, indeed, this Court has expressly held that IRS summons enforcement orders are subject to appellate review. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440,449. Although several Courts of Appeals have accepted the Government’s argument in IRS enforcement proceedings, the force of that line of authority is matched by a similar array of decisions reaching a contrary conclusion in proceedings enforcing Federal Trade Commission discovery requests. There is no significant difference between the governing statutes that can explain the

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10 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CAL. v. UNITED STATES

divergent interpretations, nor any reason to conclude that production of records relevant to a tax investigation should have mootness consequences that production of other business records does not have. Pp.12-18.

Vacated and remanded.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Eric M. Lieberman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David B. Goldstein, Hillary Richard, and Michael Lee Hertzberg.

Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Griffin, Kent L. Jones, Charles E. Brookhart, and John A. Dudeck, Jr.

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. Two tapes recording conversations between officials of the Church of Scientology (Church) and their attorneys in July 1980 have been the principal bone of contention in this, and two earlier, legal proceedings.

In an action filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court,l the Church contended that the defendant had unlawfully acquired possession of the tapes. Pending resolution of that action, the state court ordered its Clerk to take custody of the tapes and certain other documents.

In 1984, in connection with an investigation of the tax returns of L. Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sought access to the Church documents in the state-court Clerk’s possession.2

1 Church of Scientology of California v. Armstrong, No. C420 153.

2 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as the delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury, has broad authority to examine the accuracy of federal tax returns. See generally Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517, 523-525 (1971). Section 7602(a) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary to summon any person to provide documents relevant to such an examination:

“For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any per-

11

After the Clerk was served with an IRS summons, he permitted IRS agents to examine and make copies of the tapes. Thereafter, in a federal action initiated by the Church in the Central District of California, the District Court entered a temporary restraining order directing the IRS to file its copies of the tapes, and all related notes, with the federal court.3 Those copies were subsequently returned to the Clerk of the state court.

On January 18, 1985, the IRS commenced this proceeding by filing a petition to enforce the summons that had previously been served on the state-court Clerk.4 The Church intervened and opposed production of the tapes on the ground that they were protected by the attorney-client privilege. After protracted proceedings, including review in this Court, see United States v. Zolin, 491 U. S. 554 (1989), on April 15, 1991, the District Court entered an order enforcing compliance with the summons. The Church filed a timely notice of appeal and unsuccessfully sought a stay of that order. While the appeal was pending, copies of the tapes were delivered to the IRS. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals ordered the Church to show cause why its ap-

son for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is authorized-

“(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry.” 26 U. S. C. § 7602(a).

3 Church of Scientology v. Armstrong, No. CV 84-9003-HLH (CD Cal., Nov. 27, 1984).

4 Sections 7402(b) and 7604(a) confer jurisdiction on the federal district courts to enforce a summons issued by the IRS. Title 26 U. S. C. § 7402(b) provides:

“If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.”

Section 7604(a) is virtually identical to § 7402(b) except that the word “records” appears in § 7604(a).

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12 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CAL. v. UNITED STATES

peal should not be dismissed as moot. After briefing on the mootness issue, the court dismissed the appeal. It explained:

“Because it is undisputed that the tapes have been turned over to the IRS in compliance with the summons enforcement order, no controversy exists presently and this appeal is moot.” United States v. Zolin, No. 9155506 (CA9, Sept. 10, 1991).

We granted the Church’s petition for certiorari to consider the narrow question whether the appeal was properly dismissed as moot. 503 U. S. 905 (1992).

I

It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority “to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653 (1895). See also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971). For that reason, if an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant “any effectual relief whatever” to a prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed. Mills, 159 U. S., at 653. In this case, after the Church took its appeal from the April 15 order, in compliance with that order copies of the tapes were delivered to the IRS. The Government contends that it was thereafter impossible for the Court of Appeals to grant the Church any effectual relief. We disagree.

While a court may not be able to return the parties to the status quo ante-there is nothing a court can do to withdraw all knowledge or information that IRS agents may have acquired by examination of the tapes-a court can fashion some form of meaningful relief in circumstances such as

13

these. Taxpayers have an obvious possessory interest in their records. When the Government has obtained such materials as a result of an unlawful summons, that interest is violated and a court can effectuate relief by ordering the Government to return the records. Moreover, even if the Government retains only copies of the disputed materials, a taxpayer still suffers injury by the Government’s continued possession of those materials, namely, the affront to the taxpayer’s privacy. A person’s interest in maintaining the privacy of his “papers and effects” is of sufficient importance to merit constitutional protection.5 Indeed, that the Church considers the information contained on the disputed tapes important is demonstrated by the long, contentious history of this litigation. Even though it is now too late to prevent, or to provide a fully satisfactory remedy for, the invasion of privacy that occurred when the IRS obtained the information on the tapes, a court does have power to effectuate a partial remedy by ordering the Government to destroy or return any and all copies it may have in its possession. The availability of this possible remedy is sufficient to prevent this case from being moot.6

5 The Fourth Amendment provides:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

6 Petitioner also argues that a court can effectuate further relief by ordering the IRS to refrain from any future use of the information that it has derived from the tapes. Such an order would obviously go further towards returning the parties to the status quo ante than merely requiring the IRS to return the tapes and all copies thereof. However, as there is no guarantee that the IRS will in fact use the information gleaned from the tapes, it could be argued that such an order would be an impermissible advisory opinion. Cf. G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 359 (1977) (suppression of fruits of illegal IRS search “premature” as issue can be considered “if and when proceedings arise in which the Government seeks to use the documents or information obtained from them”). But

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14 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CAL. v. UNITED STATES

The Government argues, however, that these basic principles are inapplicable in IRS summons enforcement proceedings because of the particular nature of the statute governing such proceedings. Reasoning from the premise that federal courts are empowered to consider only those matters within their jurisdiction, the Government argues that in IRS summons enforcement proceedings the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court is limited to determining only whether the court should “compel … production of” the information requested by the summons. 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402(b), 7604(a). See n. 4, supra. Once the court has answered that question and compliance has occurred, there is nothing more for the district court to decide and the jurisdiction of the district court evaporates.

We think the Government misconceives the inquiry in this case. The Government mayor may not be right that under §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a) the jurisdiction of the district court is limited to those matters directly related to whether or not the summons should be enforced. Indeed, the scope of the district court’s jurisdiction under those provisions was the issue over which this Court deadlocked in United States v. Zolin, 491 U. S. 554 (1989).7 The question presented in the

see FTC v. Gibson Products of San Antonio, Inc., 569 F.2d 900, 903 (CA5 1978) (court can effectuate relief, despite compliance with FTC subpoena, by requiring FTC to return subpoenaed documents and forbidding FTC to use materials in adjudicatory hearing). Because we are concerned only with the question whether any relief can be ordered, we leave the “future use” question for another day. For now, we need only hold that this case is not moot because a court has power to order the IRS to return or destroy any copies of the tapes that it may have in its possession.

7 In Zolin, the District Court enforced the IRS summons, but placed restrictions on the IRS’ ability to disclose the summoned materials to any other government agency. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1416-1417 (1987), and we granted certiorari in part to consider whether the District Court, in conditioning its enforcement of the IRS summons, exceeded its jurisdiction under §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a). Zolin, 491 U. S., at 556. We were evenly divided on that question and therefore affirmed the Ninth Circuit. Id., at 561. The issue still divides

15

current incarnation of this case is whether there was jurisdiction in the appellate court to review the allegedly unlawful summons enforcement order. On that question, the Government’s elaborate statutory argument is largely irrelevant. There is nothing in the statute to suggest that Congress sought to preclude appellate review of district court enforcement orders. To the contrary, we have expressly held that IRS summons enforcement orders are subject to appellate review. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440, 449 (1964). Thus, whether or not there is jurisdiction in the appellate court to review the District Court’s order turns not on the subject matter of Congress’ jurisdictional grant to the district courts, but on traditional principles of justiciability, namely, whether an intervening event has rendered the controversy moot. And, as we have already explained, this case is not moot because if the summons were improperly issued or enforced a court could order that the IRS’ copies of the tapes be either returned or destroyed.

II

We recognize that several Courts of Appeals have accepted the Government’s argument in IRS enforcement proceedings,S but the force of that line of authority is matched

the lower courts. Compare United States v. Zolin, 809 F. 2d, at 14161417, and United States v. Author Services, Inc., 804 F.2d 1520, 1525-1526 (CA9 1986) (district court has “considerable” discretion to set terms of enforcement order), opinion amended, 811 F.2d 1264 (1987), with United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341(CA5 1988) (en banc) (district court lacks authority to “conditionally enforce” IRS summons; inquiry limited to single question of whether summons should be enforced), cert. denied, 492

8 United States v. Kersting, 891 F.2d 1407, 1410, n. 8 (CA9 1989), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 812 (1990); Hintze v. IRS, 879 F.2d 121, 124-125 (CA4 1989); United States v. Church of World Peace, 878 F.2d 1281 (CAlO 1989); United States v. Sherlock, 756 F.2d 1145, 1146-1147 (CA5 1985); United States v. First Family Mortgage Corp., 739 F.2d 1275, 1278-1279 (CA7 1984); United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526,533 (CA7 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 1018 (1982); United States v. Equity Farmers Elevator, 652 F.2d 752

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16 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CAL. v. UNITED STATES

by a similar array of decisions reaching a contrary conclusion in proceedings enforcing Federal Trade Commission (FTC) discovery requests.9 There is no significant difference between the governing statutes that can explain the divergent interpretations.lO Nor is there any reason to conclude that

(CA8 1981); United States v. Silva & Silva Accountancy Corp., 641 F.2d 710, 711 (CA9 1981); United States v. Deak-Perera Int’l Banking Corp., 610 F.2d 89 (CA2 1979); Kurshan v. Riley, 484 F.2d 952 (CA4 1973); United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144, 1145 (CA1 1971). But see Gluck

9 See FTC v. Gibson Products of San Antonio, Inc., 569 F. 2d, at 903 (compliance with district court order enforcing FTC subpoena does not moot appeal; court can effectuate relief by requiring FTC to return subpoenaed documents and forbidding FTC from using materials in adjudicatory hearing); FTC v. Ernstthal, 197 U. S. App. D. C. 174, 175,607 F.2d 488, 489 (1979) (compliance with FTC subpoena does not moot appeal where court can order FTC to return subpoenaed documents); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. FTC, 546 F.2d 646, 650 (CA5 1977) (same); FTC v. Browning, 140 U. S. App. D. C. 292, 293-294, n. 1, 435 F.2d 96, 97-98, n. 1 (1970) (same). Cf. FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 296 U. S. App. D. C. 124, 127, n. 1, 965 F.2d 1086, 1089, n. 1 (1992) (compliance with district court order enforcing FTC civil investigative demand pursuant to 15 U. S. C. §57b-1(e) does not moot appeal as court could order FTC “to return responsive materials and to destroy any records derived from them”); Casey v. FTC, 578 F.2d 793(CA9 1978) (action seeking to enjoin FTC investigation presents live controversy despite parties’ compliance with FTC subpoena as appellate court can order FTC to return wrongfully subpoenaed records). See also Government of Territory of Guam v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 294 U. S. App. D. C. 292, 295, 958 F.2d 1150, 1153 (1992) (compliance with district court order enforcing Federal Maritime Commission discovery order does not moot appeal where party seeks return of discovered materials).

There is no merit to the Government’s contention that the FTC cases are distinguishable in that they involve adjudicative, as opposed to investigative, subpoenas. While Gibson Products involved an adjudicative subpoena, Invention Submission, Casey, and Atlantic Richfield all involved investigative subpoenas.

10 In fact, the summons enforcement provisions of the Internal Revenue Code “closely paralle[l]” the corresponding provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-

17

production of records relevant to a tax investigation should have mootness consequences that production of other business records does not have. Moreover, in construing these provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the Court has considered it appropriate to rely on its earlier cases involving other statutes, including the Federal Trade Commission Act. See United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 57 (1964) (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 642-643 (1950)).

We therefore conclude that the appeal was improperly dismissed as moot. In so concluding we express no opinion on the merits of the Church’s argument that the Government did not establish an adequate evidentiary basis to support the District Court’s determination that the tapes fell within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Nor do we express any opinion about the res judicata contention advanced in the Government’s brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. Brief for United States in Opposition

1964, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 90 (1964). Section 9 of the FTC Act provides, in pertinent part:

“Any of the district courts of the United States … may, in case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, partnership, or corporation issue an order requiring such person, partnership, or corporation … to produce documentary evidence if so ordered …. ” 38 Stat. 722, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 49.

In the words of Professor Handler:

“Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate to summon taxpayers or other witnesses to testify and to produce relevant and material documents. Section 9 of the FTC Act grants the same power to the Commission. Should a recipient of a summons or subpoena refuse to comply, both statutes afford the same enforcement procedures. In neither case is the administrative subpoena self-executing: obedience can be obtained only by court order. In addition, both statutes, which are in pari materia, make it a criminal offense to ‘neglect’ to appear or to produce subpoenaed documents.” 63 Mich. L. Rev., at 91 (footnotes omitted).

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13-14. We simply hold that compliance with the summons enforcement order did not moot the Church’s appeal.ll

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

11 In reaching this conclusion, we reject petitioner’s “fall back” argument that even if compliance with a summons enforcement order by the subject of the IRS investigation moots an appeal, compliance by a disinterested third party-here, the Clerk of the Los Angeles Superior Court-does not. Brief for Petitioner 25-34; Reply Brief for Petitioner 16-18. We agree with the Government that a “difference in the method of compliance does not create a distinction for the purpose of the constitutional case or controversy requirement.” Brief for United States 30. This case presents a justiciable controversy not because a third party complied with the summons enforcement order, but because petitioner has a stake in the outcome of the proceeding and a federal court can effectuate relief should petitioner prevail on the merits.

There is a distinction in the law between the enforcement of discovery orders directed at parties and the enforcement of discovery orders directed at disinterested third parties, but that distinction derives from concerns regarding finality, not mootness. As a general rule, a district court’s order enforcing a discovery request is not a “final order” subject to appellate review. A party that seeks to present an objection to a discovery order immediately to a court of appeals must refuse compliance, be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt order. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971). However, under the so-called Perlman doctrine, see Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918), a discovery order directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately appealable final order because the third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance. Ibid. See generally 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3914.23, pp. 156-167 (2d ed. 1992). This distinction has no bearing on this case because a district court order enforcing an IRS summons is an appealable final order. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440 (1964). There is no “third-party exception” because there is no general rule barring immediate appeal of IRS summons enforcement orders.

Notes

This document inPDF format. ↩

Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment (August 26, 1991)

August 26, 1991 by Clerk1

Earle C. Cooley
COOLEY, MANION, MOORE & JONES, P.C.
21 Custom House Street
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 737-3100

William T. Drescher
23679 Calabasas Road, Suite 338
Calabasas, CA 91302
(818) 591-0039

Attorneys for Defendants
CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY and RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER

Eric M. Lieberman
RABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, STANDARD,
KRINSKY & LIEBERMAN, P.C.
740 Broadway at Astor Place
New York, NY 10003-9518
(212) 254-1111

John J. Quinn
QUINN, KULLY AND MORROW
520 S. Grand Avenue, 8th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 622-0300

Laurie J. Bartilson
BOWLES & MOXON
6255 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 2000,
Los Angeles, CA 90028
(213) 661-4030

Attorneys for Defendant
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

Michael Lee Hertzberg
740 Broadway, Fifth Floor
New York, NY 10003
(212) 982-9870

James H. Berry, Jr.
BERRY & CAHALAN
2049 Century Park East
Suite 2750
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(213) 284-2126

Attorneys for Defendant
AUTHOR SERVICES, INC.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICKI J. AZNARAN and
RICHARD N. AZNARAN,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,
Defendants.
AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.

CASE No. CV 88-1786 JMI(Ex)

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS¹

Notes

Reply to Motion for SJ in PDF format (1991-08-26) ↩

Oral Deposition of Vicki J. Aznaran (June 22, 1988)

June 22, 1988 by Clerk1

                    237

VICKI J. AZNARAN –    6-22-88       VOLUME 2¹

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICKI J. AZNARAN AND
RICHARD N. AZNARAN

VERSUS

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA, INC.;
CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY, INC.;
SCIENTOLOGY MISSIONS INTERNATIONAL, INC.;
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, INC.;
AUTHOR SERVICES, INC.;
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, INC.;
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF LOS ANGELES, INC.;
MISSION OFFICE WORLDWIDE;
AUTHOR FAMILY TRUST;
THE ESTATE OF L. RON HUBBARD;
DAVID MISCAVIGE;
AND
NORMAN STARKEY

NO. CV 88-1786-WDK

ORAL DEPOSITION OF VICKI J. AZNARAN

On the 22nd day of June, 1988, at 10:00 a.m., the oral deposition of the above-named witness was taken at the instance of the Defendants before Roger W. Miller, Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Texas, at the offices of Cohan, Simpson, Cowlishaw, Aranza & Wulff, in the City of Dallas, County of Dallas, State of Texas, pursuant the agreement hereinbefore set forth.

STANLEY, HARRIS, RICE 720-4567

VICKI J. AZNARAN – 6-22-88

VOLUME 2

APPEARANCES

Appearing for the Plaintiffs

CUMMINS & WHITE
1600 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90017-1695

Appearing for Defendant Author Services, Inc.

Mr. Michael Lee Hertzberg
275 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10016

Appearing for Defendant Religious Technology

COOLEY, MANION, MOORE & JONES
Russia Wharf West
530 Atlantic Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02210

By: Mr. Earle Cooley

Also present:

Mr. Aron C. Mason
Mr. Mark Rathbun

[…]
327

VICKI J. AZNARAN –    6-22-88       VOLUME 2

because I was just doing missions.

Q   Who was the head of the CMO at that time?

A   Part of the time, John Nelson was, and part of the time Dee Dee Residorf’s sister, but I can’t think of her name. Gail.

Q   Gail Reisdorf or Gail —

A   The mother of —

Q   Irwin, Gail Irwin?

A   Yes.

Q   Now, although — did you destroy these documents in the Guardian’s Office on your own origination or were you ordered to do so?

A   Ordered to do so.

Q   And who ordered you to do so?

A   Steve Marlowe. M-a-r-l-o-w-e, I believe.

Q   Now, you also testified that in 1984 you removed documents from Gerald Armstrong’s PC folder to keep these documents from going to court. Remember that?

A   Yes.

Q   Were you a Deputy IG — Deputy Inspector General at the Religious Technology Center at that time?

A   Or Inspector General.

Q   Or Inspector General? And did you have

STANLEY, HARRIS, RICE 720-4567

328

VICKI J. AZNARAN –    6-22-88       VOLUME 2

custody and control of Armstrong’s PC folder?

A   I did for a certain time period, yes.

Q   During what time period?

A   I don’t remember. Might have been 1985 or sometime in 1984.

Q   Well, now, in what case were these PC folders going to court?

A   I believe it was a suit that the church had brought against Jerry Armstrong.

Q   The suit that the church brought against Armstrong?

A   I think so.

Q   And did you remove these documents from Mr. Armstrong’s PC folder on your own origination or on somebody’s instructions?

A   I can’t remember exactly how it came about. The folders were with the Office of Special Affairs, and there was — I think that Judge Breckenridge had ordered them turned over. And I was informed by this — of this by someone at OSA, and I am not positive right now who informed me of the Judge’s order. And seems like there was a meeting or something about it or — I’m really not real clear on how it started. And then I had the PC folders brought over to RTC in LA, where I went

STANLEY, HARRIS, RICE 720-4567

329

VICKI J. AZNARAN –    6-22-88       VOLUME 2

through them and removed things from them. And some of those things I destroyed, and some of them I put away or gave to someone in OSA, I believe.

Q   My question is:   Did you do that own your own origination or did somebody order you to do it?

A   Well, I believe I was told to do it, but I can’t remember who, right now.

Q   Do you recall that, during that period of time, you had two positions, your position at RTC and the position of CO, OSA Int.?

A   No, I wasn’t CO, OSA Int. at that time.

Q   When were you commanding officer of OSA Int.?

A   I believe it was for two or three months in late — in 1984.

Q   Which two or three months?

A   I don’t honestly recall. I think it was late, like October. No, November, maybe September, October, November.

Q   Did you ever inform Gerald Armstrong that you did this?

A   No.

Q   Did you ever inform Michael Flynn that you did this?

A   No.

STANLEY, HARRIS, RICE 720-4567

421

VICKI J. AZNARAN –    6-22-88       VOLUME 2

STATE OF TEXAS )
COUNTY OF DALLAS )

I, Roger W. Miller, Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Texas, certify that the foregoing deposition of VICKI J. AZNARAN was reported stenographically by me at the time and place indicated, said witness having been placed under oath by me, and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the witness.

I further certify that I am neither counsel for nor related to any party in this cause and am not financially interested in its outcome.

Given under my hand and seal of office on this the 22nd day of June, 1988.

[signed Roger W. Miller]
Roger W. Miller, Certified
Shorthand Reporter No. 1357 in
and for the State of Texas
Stanley, Harris, Rice, Cogburn,
Stunkard, Miller & Associates, Inc.
3100 McKinnon, Suite 1000
Dallas, Texas 75201

My commission expires December 31, 1988.

STANLEY, HARRIS, RICE 720-4567

Notes

Document sources: http://www.gerryarmstrong.org/50k/legal/related/3961.php; http://www.gerryarmstrong.org/ga/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/depo-aznaran-1988-06-22.pdf ↩

Declaration of Michael Lee Hertzberg (September 20, 1999)

Notes

Appellant’s Opening Brief (January 19, 1993)

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF¹

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Notes

CSC v. US (November 16, 1992)

Notes

Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment (August 26, 1991)

Notes

Oral Deposition of Vicki J. Aznaran (June 22, 1988)

Notes

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