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The Armstrong Op

Scientology's fair game on Gerry Armstrong

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Documents

Video: GA signs Scientology’s “Settlement Agreement” (December 6, 1986)

December 6, 1986 by Clerk1

Notes

See Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement.

Filed Under: Cult documents Tagged With: Armstrong 1, Gerry Armstrong, Lawrence E. Heller, Michael J. Flynn, Mike Sutter

Declaration of Gerald Armstrong (November 18, 1986)

November 18, 1986 by Clerk1

 

DECLARATION OF GERALD ARMSTRONG1

I, GERALD ARMSTRONG, declare as follows:

1) I have been advised by my attorney, Julia Dragojevic, that cross-defendant organization has moved to continue the trial of the cross-complaint, now set for January 19, 1987. The organization has offered three reasons for its motion: A) it was not aware of a “brainwashing” claim until it got my response to its motion for summary adjudication on the application of statutes of limitation to the pc file issue; B) it wants to first get the Appeals Court decision in the document
case; C) it needs more time for discovery. 2) “Brainwashing” is the organization’s term. It cannot profess ignorance of the subject as L. Ron Hubbard wrote as early as 1956 in a “Technical Bulletin” attached hereto as Exhibit A:

“We (Scientology) know more about psychiatry than psychiatrists. We can brainwash faster than the Russians (20 secs to total amnesia against three years to slightly confused loyalty).”

And the organization cannot honestly claim that any mention by me of Hubbardian or organization mind control is a new surprise. Attached hereto as Exhibit B are two pages from a declaration I filed in 1982 in which I state: “What most Scientologists, and especially Sea Org members don’t know is that Mr. Hubbard had duped

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them. My knowledge based on documentation and observation, is that the major reason for Mr. Hubbard’s calling Scientology a ‘religion,’ in addition to tax evasion, is to hide behind Constitutional guarantees for religions and so carry out his scheme of mind control to keep his followers duped. He has systematically and knowingly lied to and defrauded his followers, kept them from finding out the truth or becoming free with cruel and bizarre treatment, as for example with the RPF, and kept them economically and mentally suppressed, while he made millions of dollars from their labor.”

The Court touched on mind control in the decision in the document case:

….the Church or its minions is fully capable of intimidation or other physical of psychological abuse if it suits their ends. The record is replete with evidence of such abuse.”

And common sense yields only mind control as the explanation for the years of submission to the abuse. The organization has known of its own practices for decades, has known for over four years that I defined some of those practices as mind control, and has known for over two years that the Court considered “psychological abuse” and Hubbard’s “controlling, manipulating….his adherents” part of this case. Mind control is not a new subject which would require of the organization a new defense or more time in which

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to create it.

3) Regarding continuing the trial of the cross-complaint until issuance of the Appeals Court decision in the document case, it was cross-defendant organization which moved to sever the cross-complaint as unrelated to the underlying document case.

4) In the document case, for a trial that lasted thirty days, because the organization insisted on an expedited trial, I had twenty months in which to prepare for my defense. From the time of filing of the cross-complaint until the present trial date, the organization will have had fifty months. The organization has taken my deposition at least twenty-five days, and has taken the deposition of virtually everyone connected to me at some point in this litigation. Each person on this side whom the organization has sought to depose has complied and has answered any relevant questions. My attorneys advise me that because of the organization’s compartmentalization and obstructionist tactics, taking any organization depositions is a costly and frustrating waste of time. The organization knows virtually ever fact of my life since I was born which has any connection at all to the issues in the cross-complaint; there is nothing left to discover. Discovery by the organization is for this reason, and because of attorney tactics and behavior, largely harassive. The extension of discovery is just the extension of harassment.

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5) The organization cannot honestly argue that it was prevented in any way from getting whatever discovery it has wanted or from getting its many motions, several of which were in fact obstructive of legitimate discovery, heard by this Court. The organization has used 12 law firms in this case, and these attorneys have all been involved in other Scientology litigation and have deposed all my potential witnesses in those cases in addition to this. In addition to the staggering sums paid to attorneys to litigate this case, the organization has paid at least hundreds of thousands of dollars for PI’s, for intelligence operations and for media black PR campaigns against me. Where it could not wait for legal discovery, it stole my documents. And as shown in my earlier declarations, it has, through perjury and manipulation, thwarted my discovery into its clear cut and egregious invasions of my privacy and assaults on my mind.

6) The organization has demonstrated continually throughout the litigation of this case that truth, which must have some relationship to legitimate discovery, is, as far as the organization is concerned, irrelevant. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of a recitation of a dream I had in March 1985. I have blacked out for this purpose, anything which could be considered offensive. Donald Randolph has, in furtherance of the organization’s goals, defined the recitation of the dream a “sickening work” demonstrating my “extremely aberrated activities.” The dream was a dream. The recitation was true, and as artistically tight as I was capable of. To the

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organization, if it suits its purposes, however, dreams are reality, and truth is whatever can be twisted therefrom. The only thing “sickening” about the dream is how the organization acquired it and went about its degradation. I sent it to my friend Dan Sherman, a professional writer who had throughout 1984 encouraged me to write and who had “critiqued” some of my work. Sherman was, of course, being operated by the organization in the “Armstrong operation” (the same operation which John Peterson says never happened), and Sherman either gave the organization the “dream” he had dutifully tricked me into sending him, or the organization simply stole it from him. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a letter from Sherman from March 1986 in which he indicates that the organization was indeed getting his mail. Since writing to me, however, Sherman has apparently again been pressured by the organization because he has again cut communication with me and gone into hiding.

Another example of organizational perversion of truth is the whole Armstrong operation. A group of individuals fearing for their lives and asking me for help to reform the organization became in organization black PR campaigns my attempt to destroy religion. Efforts by the organization to enveigle me into illegal acts became my commission of the acts. Use of my pc files as a lure to entrap and ruin me is characterized as protecting the sanctity of auditing. The organization needs no more discovery since it creates “truth” and “evidence,” as it wishes.
////

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7) All the discovery the organization has sought can be completed in the next two. weeks. I have been answering interrogatories, in addition to all the other work I must still do, and despite the fact that none of the interrogatories cover anything which I have not already testified about, and I will complete them by November 26, 1986. The organization took my deposition on October 29 and 30 and they can have my deposition another day before trial if they want. They have made no request to set a date for the continuation of my deposition since the two days in October. The organization, just to delay the trial, should not be permitted to delay the discovery opportunities it has.

8) Although the organization is clearly not harmed if the cross-complaint goes to trial January 19, I will be if it doesn’t. Through all the operations, the lies and attacks over more than four years, the hope of going to trial has been a major stabilizing factor in keeping me going. I do not have the extra legal options which the organization does; my only opportunity to resolve this protracted, bitter and emotionally devastating war is at trial. My life has been radically altered by the organization’s acts: the threats, the assaults, the pc file perversions, the obstruction, the lies, the operations, the betrayals, the terror. The intensity has fluctuated and there were brief periods when my life moved toward normalization, but always briefly as another organization attack was never far away.

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Since the July pc file culling, however, there has been no respite. The anguish I feel just about every day may be a blessing because the emotional ripple does not manifest itself in other more destructive ways. But I cannot feel that it is optimum or normal or healthy; that is, I’m under a ton of stress. I have grappled with the litigation and the extra-litigation threat in many ways. Some of them, even within the observable context of Gerald Armstrong, and even to myself, are bizarre.

Almost the whole day now, and day after day, is connected to this subject. Sometimes I feel like my body is a battleground. Outside my apartment and office, and those are just about all my destinations, I am most of the time aware of the cold evaluation of threat. I am intellectually sound enough to realize that to succeed in getting the cross-complaint to trial raises the potential for a really serious operation. The emotional ramifications which follow from that are what I deal with. That is, the alteration of the circuitry. The lessening of the threat can only be achieved, however, by going forward, even though what could happen at trial could be beyond anything I’ve yet experienced. All the operations have had the ultimate goal of stopping me from proceeding to trial. They have only succeeded in convincing me that the only way the war and the threat can end is to get to trial.

Executed this 18th day of November, 1986 at Boston, Massachusetts.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Gerald Armstrong

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Notes

  1. This document in PDF format. ↩︎

Filed Under: Legal Tagged With: Armstrong 1, Dan Sherman, Donald C. Randolph, Julia Dragojevic, L. Ron Hubbard, Loyalist Program, PC folders

Declaration of Gerry Armstrong (November 1, 1986)

November 1, 1986 by Clerk1

http://www.gerryarmstrong.org/50k/legal/a1/976.php

Filed Under: Legal Tagged With: B-1, Gerry Armstrong Project, John G. Peterson, Ken Hoden, PC folders

Declaration of Gerry Armstrong: excerpt re Armstrong Operation (October 11, 1986)

October 11, 1986 by Clerk1

8. Another example of documents clearly withheld by plaintiff organization is in regards to the program to get the LA DA to bring criminal charges against me — ultimately to have me jailed. This is all part of the “Armstrong Operation.” At p. 23, no. 11 of the April 1986 declaration I showed, from the mouth of CSC, CSI, RTC and Hubbard attorney Earle C. Cooley, the existence of such documentation.1 The organization has produced none of these documents. A letter from the Office of the LA DA dated April 25, 1986, attached hereto as Exhibit [J],2 however, reveals that Mr. Peterson and organization personnel provided a mass of documentation, even more than I knew before then existed, to the DA. Mr. Peterson knows that I know because he got the DA’s letter. To consider that all this was done from no written orders, programs, evaluations or missions is madness. It should be noted that the recipients of the DA letter were all GO staff. Lyman Spurlock’s testimony at trial in 1984 that he (as ASI staff) and others got rid of the 1100 GO staff criminals is untrue. Ken Hoden was GO staff: in fact he was involved in the program on Hubbard’s orders to bring criminal charges against Julie Christofferson. Heber Jentzsch was a GO PR staffer for many years who was used for the organization’s frontal PR attacks on enemies. He continues to perform the same organization function. David Butterworth is a longtime GO staff member. When I knew him in the organization he was an aide to Mary Sue Hubbard in the Controller’s Office. John Peterson has been connected to

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[CT 6259]

the GO from the 1970’s.3

Notes

  1. See Declaration of Gerry Armstrong April 09, 1986. ↩︎
  2. See Letter from Office of the LA DA to Ken Hoden, et al. ↩︎
  3. From Declaration of Gerald Armstrong October 11, 1986. Filed in Armstrong 1. ↩︎

Filed Under: Legal Tagged With: David Butterworth, Earle C. Cooley, Heber C. Jentzsch, John G. Peterson, Julie Christofferson, Ken Hoden, L. Ron Hubbard, Lyman Spurlock, Mary Sue Hubbard

Opinion: Founding Church of Scientology v. Webster (September 26, 1986)

September 26, 1986 by Clerk1

FOUNDING CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY v. WEBSTER
No. 85-5885.

802 F.2d 1448 (1986)

FOUNDING CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF WASHINGTON, D.C., INC., Appellant,
v.
William H. WEBSTER, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States, et al.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 3, 1986.
Decided September 26, 1986.
Anthony P. Bisceglie, Washington, D.C., with whom William C. Walsh and Jeffrey B. O’Toole were on the brief, for appellant.
Freddi Lipstein, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., with whom Richard K. Willard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., and Barbara L. Herwig, Atty., Dept. of Justice, were on the brief, for appellees. Anthony J. Steinmeyer and E. Roy Hawkens, Attys., Dept. of Justice, also entered appearances for appellees.
Regina Jackson, Washington, D.C., was on the brief foramici curiae, American Coalition of Unregistered Churches, et al., urging reversal.
Before GINSBURG, STARR, and SILBERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge STARR.

STARR, Circuit Judge:

The appeal before us marks the end of eight years of litigation in a case that has never passed beyond the stage of pre-trial discovery. The District Court dismissed the case as a sanction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 for failure to comply with a discovery order entered by the court. Specifically, L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scientology, failed to appear for a court-ordered deposition to inquire into his status as a managing agent of that organization. We are satisfied that the District Court acted lawfully within its authority and sound discretion. We therefore affirm.

I

In 1978, the Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. (“Scientology”) filed suit on behalf of itself and a class composed of all “Churches” and “Missions” of Scientology in the United States. In its complaint, Scientology named the United States and numerous federal officials as defendants.1 The complaint alleged an extensive campaign of government harassment that included illegal investigative and law enforcement activities, collection and dissemination of information about Scientology and other related organizations, and encouragement of hostility toward the movement inside and outside the federal government.

By virtue of this alleged unlawful activity, Scientology asserted violations of the First, Fourth and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution. It sought compensatory and punitive damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act; a declaratory judgment that the defendants’ actions had violated the Constitution and laws of the United States; an injunction against further law enforcement activities by defendants directed at the various Scientology “Churches” and their members; and further injunctive relief to expunge or destroy false and derogatory information allegedly collected and obtained illegally by defendants and placed in government records.

In an initial opinion and order dated October 19, 1978, the District Court dismissed the damage claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the claim for injunctive relief from asserted religiously based discrimination on the grounds that plaintiff had not pursued the exclusive remedy available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The trial court allowed the remainder of the suit to proceed and conditionally certified a class of all Scientology Churches and Missions for purposes of seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

Subsequent developments in the case followed on the heels of a criminal prosecution, United States v. Mary Sue Hubbard, Crim. No. 78-401, slip op. (D.D.C. order

[802 F.2d 1450]

enforcing plea agreement Oct. 8, 1979), brought against nine high ranking officials of the Church of Scientology. In that case, several defendants stipulated that the network of Scientology organizations had conducted a broad campaign against U.S. Government entities and officials, particularly the Internal Revenue Service.2 This concerted campaign by the Scientology apparatus encompassed a wide range of illegal activities, including theft of government documents for use in litigation against the United States, falsification of government identification cards, wiretapping, infiltration and perjury.On the basis of this new evidence, the defendants in the present case sought to amend their answer to the complaint in order to interpose a defense of “unclean hands.” The United States Magistrate, in a decision affirmed by the District Court, permitted the defense to be raised and discovery to be conducted without deciding whether such a defense should in fact be applied in this case. We pause to observe that “unclean hands” as a defense went to the injunctive remedy, but not to the request for declaratory relief. As will be seen, however, the defendants contend on appeal that the discovery they sought extended beyond this defense to provide a general, substantive defense to the claims asserted in this suit.3

On August 21, 1984, as part of a series of discovery requests, the Government noticed the deposition of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scientology, in his capacity as “an officer, director, or managing agent of plaintiffs.” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 163. When Hubbard failed to appear for the deposition on the designated date, defendants moved to dismiss the suit or, in the alternative, to compel Hubbard’s deposition. The court responded by ordering defendants to renotice the deposition and to submit a factual proffer as to why Hubbard’s deposition was necessary. J.A. at 262. The court stated that if Hubbard did not appear, the Government could then renew its alternative motion to compel his deposition or dismiss the case. The defendants submitted the requested factual proffer and renoticed the deposition. Hubbard again failed to appear on the appointed date. In the wake of this turn of events, plaintiffs submitted numerous declarations by officials of the individual Scientology churches and high officials in the central Scientology organization denying not only Hubbard’s status as managing agent but any capability of contacting him. J.A. at 271-350. The Government responded with additional declarations and other evidence in support of Hubbard’s status as managing agent. J.A. at 351-407.

In an order issued March 13, 1985, the District Court found that the Government had established “at least a prima facie case” that Hubbard was managing agent as of November 19, 1984. To settle this issue conclusively, the court ordered Hubbard to appear on April 5, 1985, for a limited-purpose deposition addressed to “the issue of his relationship to the organization.” J.A. at 429. No inquiry could be made into the facts pertaining to the merits of the suit. Failure to appear, the court expressly warned, would result in dismissal of the suit altogether. Id. Submitting several additional declarations by Church employees and officials, plaintiff moved for reconsideration. J.A. at 431-72. This the court denied. J.A. at 475. On April 9, 1985, upon notification by counsel that Hubbard had failed to appear for the limited-purpose deposition as scheduled, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. J.A. at 488. On July 10, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the judgment of dismissal. Scientology then filed this appeal.

[802 F.2d 1451]

II

The ultimate question for resolution is whether the District Court abused its discretion when it dismissed this suit as a discovery sanction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37. Before we reach that issue, however, we must first determine whether the District Court properly resolved the underlying question whether the Government had shown, at least prima facie, that Hubbard was a managing agent of Scientology and could therefore be compelled to testify on its behalf.

A

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a) broadly authorizes parties to obtain discovery by various means, the first of which is “depositions upon oral examination.” Depositions thus rank high in the hierarchy of pre-trial, truth-finding mechanisms. That is not surprising. Face-to-face confrontations prior to trial, with such indicia of formality as administration of the oath, the presence of counsel and stenographic recording of the proceedings, are a critical component of the tools of justice in civil litigation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(a) thus broadly provides that “any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(2), governing the use of depositions in court proceedings, provides that the deposition “of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent … may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.” (Emphasis added.) At the same time, Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d) authorizes dismissal and other sanctions “[i]f a party or an officer, director or managing agent of a party … fails … to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice.” (Emphasis added.) The concept of “managing agent” is thus an integral part of the corpus of discovery law. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6).

Federal discovery provisions have traditionally provided a mechanism for an adverse party to secure depositions from a public or private corporation through a managing agent designated by the adverse party. In 1970, an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure replaced a specific authorization for securing depositions of managing agents with the current, more general framework, and established a new mechanism permitting the corporation (or other entity) itself to designate managing agents to sit for depositions, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6). When the entity itself makes the designation, subsequent disputes over the adverse party’s use of the deposition “for any purpose” are avoided. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 30, Advisory Comm. Note to Subdivision (b)(6), at 92 (1986). However, the language authorizing the new procedure expressly stated that it “does not preclude taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in these rules.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6). The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the Rule made clear that the new procedure does not supplant but “supplements the existing practice whereby the examining party designates the corporate official to be deposed.” The former procedure, long known to the bar, thus remains available for litigants to employ if they see fit. See Atlantic Cape Fisheries v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 F.2d 577, 578-79 (1st Cir.1975); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2103, at 373-74 (1970). It was under this traditional procedure that the Government sought to depose Hubbard.

B

We pause at this stage of our analysis to observe that there is no doubt, and appellant indeed has not sought to dispute, that Scientology qualifies under the broad category of organizations which can be deposed through an adverse party’s designation of a managing agent. Regardless of whether Scientology is a religious organization, a for-profit private enterprise, or something far more extraordinary — an intriguing question that this suit does not call upon us to examine — the entities to which the managing-agent concept can be applied include all manner of public and

[802 F.2d 1452]

private corporations and associations, non-profit and otherwise. See 4A J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 30.51, at 30-41 (2d ed. 1984).The law concerning who may properly be designated as a managing agent is sketchy.4 Largely because of the vast variety of factual circumstances to which the concept must be applied, the standard, like so many others in the law, remains a functional one to be determined largely on a case-by-case basis. See Petition of Manor Investment Co., 43 F.R.D. 299, 300 (S.D.N.Y.1967); Kolb v. A.H. Bull Steamship Co., 31 F.R.D. 252, 254 (S.D.N.Y.1962). Nearly all the published cases relating to the issue are from the district courts, and nearly all of those decisions concern whether an employee of a corporation should be designated a managing agent. 4A J. Moore, supra, ¶ 30.55, at 30-72 n. 15. Only rarely have courts even had occasion to examine whether a de facto relationship with a corporation, rather than a de jure one, furnishes a basis in law for designating a managing agent. See, e.g., Petition of Manor Investment Co., supra; Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 24 F.R.D. 19 (S.D.N.Y.1959).

In the Manor Investment case, the individual designated as a managing agent was not shown to hold any office or formal position in the corporation. He did, however, control its affairs, performing functions “of a supervisory nature” related to the activities in question. More generally, the individual exercised “supreme” authority within the corporation. Id. at 301. In addition to having practical control of the firm’s destiny, the individual owned all the stock in the enterprise. In concluding that the individual was indeed a “managing agent” of the enterprise, Judge Weinfeld found “such unity of interest between [the company] and [the owner], that it may be referred to as his `alter ego.'” Id. The learned judge thus drew on the familiar doctrine of law permitting courts, where the result would otherwise be unjust or inequitable, to pierce the corporate veil,5 a veil that ordinarily shields investors from liability for contractual obligations or tortious acts by the corporation and that protects the corporation from being bound by the independent acts of investors. See Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96-100 (D.C.Cir.1982). See generally Wormser, The Disregard of the Corporate Fiction and Allied Corporate Problems (1927); Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tex.L.Rev. 979 (1971); Berle, The Theory of the Enterprise Entity, 47 Colum.L.Rev. 342-43 (1947); Latty, Disregarding the Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 Mich.L.Rev. 597 (1936). Under the alter ego theory, the court may ignore the existence of the corporate form whenever an individual so dominates an organization “as in reality to negate its separate personality.” Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 758 (D.C.Cir.1975). The test is a practical one, focusing on how active and substantial the individual’s control is. Valley Finance, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 172 (D.C.Cir.1980).

For the purpose of determining whether an individual is a “managing agent” within the meaning of the discovery rules, the

[802 F.2d 1453]

alter ego theory provides a useful analogy. As in the arena of corporate liability, the focus begins with the character of the individual’s control. In addition, we can profitably examine both the degree to which the interests of the individual and the corporation converge, and how helpful the individual will be in fact-finding on the matter at issue, in comparison to others associated with the corporation. As in all matters appertaining to discovery, it is the ends of justice that are to be served. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 (the Federal Rules “shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”).

C

L. Ron Hubbard resigned from his official position as Executive Director of Scientology Churches in 1966, after serving for more than a decade. He continued thereafter in the ostensibly nominal position of “Founder.” The Government offered abundant evidence in the District Court, however, that Hubbard played a uniquely prominent role within Scientology and various affiliated organizations from 1966 until the early 1980’s. As founder of Scientology and the sole source of its scriptures, Hubbard enjoyed authority difficult for the founder and owner of a garden-variety private business to attain. Private, secular concerns may advance beyond the vision of its founder; new talents may need to be secured as the cycles of the organization’s development unfold. It is not at all an unfamiliar situation for the entrepreneur — the visionary — to find inhospitable the administration of the vast enterprise spawned by his experimentation in the laboratory or workshop. But an organization claiming to be a religion that is built upon the word of a single individual venerated by the flock of the faithful is, it scarcely needs to be said, a rather different sort of entity. It is not disputed that, in the spiritual or ecclesiastical matters asserted to be the high mission of Scientology organizations, the word of L. Ron Hubbard has remained unquestioned.

From evidence adduced below, Hubbard appears to have maintained control in administrative matters through high positions in such entities as the Sea Organization, “an elite fraternity of Scientologists.” Church of Scientology of California v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 381, 389 (1984).6 Indeed, uncontested declarations before the District Court leave little doubt about either the ecclesiastical or administrative dimensions of Hubbard’s authority during the period from 1966 to 1982. The declarations of Diana Sue Reisdor-Voegeding and John Nelson, associates of Hubbard until 1982, describe the mechanisms by which Hubbard controlled operations of Scientology and its related organizations, passed on orders to subordinates, and sought to avoid prosecution for his ties to the Church. J.A. at 395-403. Beyond these declarations specifically cited by the District Court (J.A. at 429), the Government submitted other declarations bearing on the question of Hubbard’s control. Laurel Sullivan, an officer in the Scientology organizations from 1973 to 1981, asserted that public pronouncements to the effect that Hubbard had at that time disassociated himself from the

[802 F.2d 1454]

Scientology organizations were “completely untrue,” and that he in fact issued orders that were immediately obeyed. J.A. at 208. Kima Douglas, who worked at the Church from 1968 through 1980, declared that Hubbard exercised “complete control over the entire (Church) organization.” J.A. at 216. Gerald Armstrong, another associate, told of a 1980 meeting to make plans to conceal Hubbard’s acknowledged control over “all aspects of” the Church of Scientology of California. J.A. at 222. The Tax Court decision to which we just alluded, in denying the California Church of Scientology tax-exempt status for the years 1970, 1971 and 1972, set forth detailed findings about Hubbard’s relation to that organization along with the numerous other Scientology organizations. Church of Scientology v. Comm’r, supra. The Tax Court harbored no doubt that Hubbard “kept control over” the policies, actions, and even the finances of the California Church. Id. at 389;7 see also n. 6, supra.Beyond the overall dominance that he exercised over the Scientology organizations during this earlier period, Hubbard was closely linked to, if not in charge of, the activities for which appellees initially sought his deposition. The primary evidence about these activities emerges from the criminal prosecution in which seven members of the church, including Hubbard’s wife, were found guilty of conspiracy to obstruct justice. In that trial, one defendant was found guilty of conspiring illegally to obtain government documents, and another was found guilty of theft of government property. See United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 301 (D.C.Cir.1980). In a Stipulation of Evidence submitted in that case, the defendants recounted a full-fledged campaign mounted by the Church of Scientology and its affiliated organizations against the United States Government, particularly the Internal Revenue Service. See Stipulation of Evidence, supra. The conspiracy, involving all levels of the Church hierarchy, encompassed theft of government documents for use in litigation against the United States, falsification of government identification cards, wiretapping, infiltration and perjury. See id. The Stipulation indicated that Hubbard “was, by virtue of his role as the founder and leader of Scientology, overall supervisor of the Guardian’s Office,” a Scientology entity which carried out these illicit activities. Id. at 7. Indeed, the grand jury named Hubbard as an unindicted co-conspirator in that case. Those indicted and convicted included not only Hubbard’s wife, who “as the second person in the hierarchy of Scientology, had duties which included supervision of the Guardian’s Office,” id. at 8, but several other officials occupying high posts in the Scientology hierarchy.

The criminal case does not stand alone. The Tax Court decision to which we previously referred denied the Church tax exempt status in part because of this conspiracy by the Scientology organizations, “beginning in 1969 and continuing at least until July 7, 1977.” Church of Scientology of California v. Comm’r, supra, 83 T.C. at 505. Finding that the Church of Scientology of California “filed false tax returns, burglarized IRS offices, stole IRS documents, and harassed, delayed, and obstructed IRS agents who tried to audit the Church’s records,” id., the Tax Court held that the California Church had violated public policy and thereby lost entitlement to any exemption which it might otherwise have enjoyed. 83 T.C. at 506-09.

Abundant evidence supports the proposition that Hubbard continued in his de facto position as head of the Church.8 Based on

[802 F.2d 1455]

the evidence in the record, the District Court rightly concluded that Hubbard was in a position to provide information about the conspiracy on behalf of the Scientology organizations for this purpose.

D

To designate Hubbard as, at least prima facie, a managing agent, the District Court had to find it probable that he remained a managing agent for the Scientology organizations at the time his deposition was sought. Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(2). 4A J. Moore, supra, ¶ 32.04. For the first scheduled deposition, Hubbard must have been, prima facie, managing agent as of November 1984; for the second, as of April 1985. Faced with overwhelming evidence of Hubbard’s continuing control over Scientology as of 1982, appellants have sought to raise doubt whether Hubbard remained as managing agent after that time and specifically at the critical, later dates of the aborted depositions. First, they emphasize that the declarants upon whose statements the Government relies held no positions in Scientology organizations after 1982. Second, Scientology submitted numerous statements by its high officials to the effect that Hubbard had engaged in communications with Scientology’s official organs only intermittently since 1982 and that he had not communicated with the Scientology apparatus since May 1984. See, e.g., Declaration of Marc Yager, J.A. at 437-39; Declaration of Guillaume Lesevre, J.A. at 446-47. Third, Scientology points to indications of organizational rearrangements around 1981-82, when Hubbard hired a law firm and a professional management agency separate from the Scientology network to handle his personal affairs. See Declaration of Lyman Spurlock, J.A. at 457-58; Declaration of Lawrence E. Heller, J.A. at 461-64.

The narrow question to be explored is whether the District Court erred in holding it probable that Hubbard continued to exercise the authority of a managing agent for Scientology insofar as he retained authority to determine whether to govern authoritatively in either administrative or ecclesiastical affairs. As noted above, Hubbard’s role as managing agent up to approximately 1982 is well established in the record. A “general principle” in the law of evidence in such matters is that “a prior or subsequent existence is evidential of a later or earlier one.” 2 Wigmore on Evidence § 437, at 514 (emphasis in original).9 In addition, the declarations of the church officials themselves, while denying Hubbard’s role,10 in fact implicitly confirmed that Hubbard, even after 1982, remained free at all relevant times to communicate to them whatever and whenever he wanted. Indeed, the two times they agree that he did communicate with the entire Scientology apparatus, in December 1983 and January 1984, Scientology dutifully issued his

[802 F.2d 1456]

statements to its members,11 exactly as if he remained in his undisputed position of authority. Lesevre Declaration at J.A. 446; Yager Declaration at J.A. 438-39. As the District Court concluded, it appears without question that had Hubbard attempted to reassert his authority in other ways, Scientology officials would have accepted that exercise of dominion over the flock. So far as we can discern, the record reveals no evidence that Hubbard intended to end his relationship with Scientology, but only that he wanted, in his unfettered discretion, to determine whether and how to continue that relationship. Ultimate control, we have no doubt, he possessed until his death.12The continued, undisputed possibility that Hubbard might unilaterally reassert his authority provided adequate justification for the trial court’s holding. Courts have accorded managing agent status to individuals who no longer exercised authority over the actions in question (and even to individuals who no longer held any position of authority in a corporation), so long as those individuals retained some role in the corporation or at least maintained interests consonant with rather than adverse to its interests. See, e.g., Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., supra; Fay v. United States, 22 F.R.D. 28, 31-32 (E.D.N.Y.1958); Curry v. States Marine Corp., supra, 16 F.R.D. 377. But see Proseus v. Anchor Lines, Ltd., supra, 26 F.R.D. 165.

But we are satisfied that the District Court’s holding in this respect rests on even stronger ground. Hubbard continued through 1984 not only as the potential leader of the Scientology organization but as the actual leader. Even as Hubbard may have sought to distance himself, for whatever reason, from administrative details and to separate his personal business affairs from the Scientology apparatus, the evidence before the District Court demonstrated that Hubbard retained preeminence as spiritual or ecclesiastical head of Scientology. The basic structure of belief for Scientology dictates that no one can replace him in this role.13 In this essential sense,

[802 F.2d 1457]

Scientology remained his alter ego despite the passive role he sought to assume. In an organization which claims to derive its purpose from Hubbard’s writings and sayings, the role that Hubbard continued to play in Scientology affairs could scarcely be viewed in law or in practical judgment as a figure of lesser status than that of managing agent.

E

We recognize that the District Court’s definition of “managing agent” imposed a greater burden on Hubbard if he truly wished to disassociate himself from the Scientology organization that might obtain for, say, the founder of a business enterprise. Yet, Hubbard’s status — as founder and spiritual leader of a movement that lays claim to the status of a religion — presents a unique situation in the application of traditional legal doctrines governing the relationship of individuals to organizations or associations with which they are or have been affiliated. While an entrepreneur might simply terminate all connections to the enterprise that he or she had founded, Hubbard’s teachings catapulted him to the epicenter of Scientology attention and activity. During his lifetime, Hubbard remained an object of allegiance and veneration even if he did not maintain regular communication with the organizational vessel. Under these unusual circumstances, we have no hesitation in upholding the District Court’s finding that the Government had shown, prima facie, Hubbard’s status as managing agent of Scientology at the pertinent times.

III

The question remains whether the trial court properly dismissed this suit under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) by virtue of Hubbard’s failure to appear at the April 1985 deposition. As in other cases of dismissal imposed as a sanction, the applicable standard of review confines appellate inquiry to whether the District Court abused its discretion. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2780, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976) (per curiam); Aruba Bonaire Curacao Trust Co. v. C.I.R., 777 F.2d 38, 44 & n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1985) (dismissing suit under “analogous” Tax Court Rule 104); Weisberg v. Webster, 749 F.2d 864, 870 (D.C.Cir.1984) (dismissing suit under Rule 37); Automated Datatron, Inc. v. Woodcock, 659 F.2d 1168, 1169 (D.C.Cir.1981) (dismissing counterclaim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)). That is, needless to say, a rule of appellate restraint, a principle faithful to the reality that appellate tribunals cannot hope to have the entire range of considerations as readily at hand as the court charged with the case in the first instance. We rightly pay great deference, as the abuse-of-discretion standard itself suggests, to the District Court’s determination in such instances. Implicit in that governing standard is the recognition that the trial court has a better “feel,” as it were, for the litigation and the remedial actions most appropriate under the circumstances presented. The Court of Appeals enters the fray only at the end of what may well be — and indeed was here — a lengthy process that moved step-by-step toward the disposition that prompts the challenge on appeal. The abuse-of-discretion standard calls on the appellate department, in a spirit of humility occasioned by not having participated in what has gone before, not just to scrutinize the conclusion but to examine with care and respect the process that led up to it.

A

The pertinent text of Rule 37 provides that when “a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party … fails … to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with proper notice … the court in which

[802 F.2d 1458]

the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just,” including “dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof.” Rule 37(b)(2), (b)(2)(C).In reviewing dismissals under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 and the closely analogous Tax Court Rule 104, we have consistently applied the rule of Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1095, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958), requiring that the dismissal be based on “willfulness, bad faith, or … fault” on the part of the plaintiff. See Aruba Bonaire Curacao Trust Co. v. C.I.R., supra, 777 F.2d at 45; Weisberg v. Webster, supra, 749 F.2d at 871. While such a finding remains a prerequisite to imposition of the dismissal sanction, it is by no means the sole consideration relevant to the determination whether to dismiss the case. As the Supreme Court has observed, a court does well to consider the deterrent effect a sanction will have on parties and potential parties in other cases who might otherwise contemplate abusive actions. See National Hockey League, supra; see also Shea v. Donohoe Construction Co., 795 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1986); Aruba Bonaire, supra, 777 F.2d at 44; Weisberg, supra, 749 F.2d at 870-71. Especially in cases of delay to the orderly progression of the litigation process, the fundamental concern of avoiding the squandering of scarce judicial resources (and the resources of other litigants) in an era of overcrowded dockets and untoward delays in getting cases decided is highly germane to whether a District Court should dismiss a case. See Donohoe Construction Co., supra, at 1075-76; Automated Datatron, Inc., supra, 659 F.2d 1168.

In review of past dismissals under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 and Tax Court Rule 104, this court has had little trouble in finding the requisite bad faith or fault where the party has failed to respond to interrogatories, see Weisberg v. Webster, supra, or failed to appear at depositions without an attempt at explanation, see Aruba Bonaire, supra. Here, despite the protestations of Scientology that it could not contact Hubbard, the District Court took Hubbard’s absence at the April deposition to “supply the requisite `element of willfulness or conscious disregard’ for the discovery process which justifies the sanction of dismissal” (citing Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231, 235 (D.C.Cir.1977)), J.A. at 475. In our view, this treatment comported with the status of managing agent that the District Court properly attributed, prima facie, to Hubbard. Since Scientology remained Hubbard’s alter ego, notice to the organization could reasonably be construed as notice to him; in consequence, the Church itself, as the party for which Hubbard was, prima facie, the managing agent, could be sanctioned for his failure to appear when ample advance notice was given of the importance of the deposition and the consequence that would attach from failure to attend to it.14

The District Court also had ample reason to interpret the failure of Hubbard to abide by its order as evidence of “willfulness, bad faith or … fault.” Societe Internationale, supra, 357 U.S. at 212, 78 S.Ct. at 1096. Appellees presented substantial evidence tha the arrangement by which Hubbard could communicate with the Church only at his initiative was in fact designed to shield Hubbard from legal process. See Declaration of Gerald Armstrong, J.A. 222; Declaration of Diana Sue Reisdorf-Voegeding, J.A. 396-98; Declaration of John Nelson, J.A. 202-03; see also documents at J.A. 22, 32-36, 237-40. Coupled with representations by Church officials about their inability to contact Hubbard, this evidence could reasonably be interpreted by the District Court as indicating that Hubbard and the Church had structured their relationship

[802 F.2d 1459]

to frustrate the orderly process of discovery proceedings.

B

Dismissal, as we have had occasion to note, is “an extremely harsh sanction.” Trakas v. Quality Brands, Inc., 759 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C.Cir.1985). Dismissal before trial is, in many circumstances, “to be taken only after unfruitful resort to lesser sanctions.” Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C.Cir.1977). The District Court nonetheless enjoys authority to impose this sanction even where “a less drastic sanction might have been entertained,” Automated Datatron, Inc., supra, 659 F.2d at 1169. But in our view, it is unnecessary to embark upon a lengthy inquiry into possible alternative sanctions under the circumstances here. No monetary or other sanction imposed on Scientology held out any realistic promise of overcoming the barrier Hubbard had chosen to erect between himself and the Church. Nor would dismissal of a part of the suit or of the pleadings suffice. The conspiracy the appellees alleged goes beyond the “unclean hands” defense as initially advanced in the District Court; rather, the far-reaching conspiracy as alleged by the Government goes to the very essence of this lawsuit, providing, if true, the basis for law enforcement activities that Scientology has attacked as illegal.15 See n. 3, supra.

To be sure, had defendants been able to secure the information they sought from a source other than Hubbard, the sanction of dismissal would have been less clearly appropriate. But that condition did not obtain here. Based upon the record before us, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Hubbard himself was “uniquely situated to provide information” relevant to the actions of Scientology against the Government. J.A. at 475. We do well to remember that for most of the era — in the period up to 1978 — with which this lawsuit is concerned, there can be no reasonable doubt that Hubbard was Scientology’s managing agent. So long as this was the case, Hubbard was the one individual likely to be best informed about the role that the conspiracy (as chronicled in the documents from United States v. Mary Sue Hubbard) played in the Scientology organization. Under those circumstances, his deposition was of critical importance. His failure to comply with a clear directive of the District Court, an order accompanied by an express threat of dismissal, warranted the sanction imposed by the District Judge in the exercise of her sound discretion.

Affirmed.

FootNotes

1. The other defendants, named in their official capacities, were the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General of the United States, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chief of the United States National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of the Army and the Postmaster General. For convenience sake, the various defendants-appellees will frequently be referred to in our discussion as “the Government.”

2.See Stipulation of Evidence filed Jan. 7, 1980 as Exhibit 1 to Memorandum of Facts and Activities in support of Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Answer.

3. The undisputed evidence of a campaign of criminal activity by the Church, the appellees argue, in fact justified the intensive law enforcement activities that the complaint attacked.See Transcript of Oral Argument, June 3, 1986, at 18-28.

4. In at least one instance, the burden of proof to establish managing-agent status has been placed on the party seeking discovery.See Proseus v. Anchor Line, Ltd., 26 F.R.D. 165, 167 (S.D.N.Y.1960). Since the ultimate decision whether a deposition qualifies as a statement by a managing agent must be made by the trial court in applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(2), courts in pretrial proceedings have resolved doubts under the standard in favor of the examining party.See Atlantic Coast Insulating Co. v. United States, 34 F.R.D. 450 (E.D.N.Y.1964);United States v. The Dorothy McAllister, 24 F.R.D. 316, 318 (S.D.N.Y.1959);Rubin v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 18 F.R.D. 51, 56 (S.D.N.Y.1955);Curry v. States Marine Corp., 16 F.R.D. 376, 377 (S.D.N.Y.1954); 4A J. Moore,supra, at ¶ 30.55(1); C. Wright & A. Miller,supra, § 2103, at 376.

5. “[T]he fiction of corporate entity may be and should be disregarded in the interests of and to promote justice in such cases as fraud, violation of law or contract, public wrong, or to work out the equities among members of the corporation internally and not involving rights of the public or third persons.”Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations § 25, at 305;see also W. Cary & M.E. Eisenberg,Cases and Materials on Corporations 80-103 (5th ed. 1980).

6. The Tax Court found that although Hubbard had officially resigned from his position as Executive Director of Scientology in 1966, he remained in the “top position.” Through the Hubbard Communications Office Policy Letters, he controlled the basic administrative policy of the California Church, the “Mother Church” of all Churches of Scientology in the United States, 81 T.C. at 389, 401. Through various types of policy directives, including “Flag Orders,” “L. Ron Hubbard Executive Directives,” and “Orders of the Day,” Hubbard directed operations in Scientology’s subsidiary organizations.Id. at 389.Hubbard also retained control over Scientology’s financial affairs. He was a signatory on all Scientology bank accounts. His approval was required for all financial planning. He was the sole trustee of a major Scientology fund. He controlled Operation Transport Corp., Ltd., a sham corporation which purportedly performed banking services for “Flag,” Scientology’s administrative center.Id. at 389, 399, 400.Further, Hubbard supervised “auditing,” the process through which Scientologists help an individual gain “spiritual competence.” He also continued to develop Scientology doctrine,id. at 385, 389, as our subsequent discussion in the text will show.

7. To be sure, the findings by various courts which have found themselves immersed in Scientology-related litigation have not been entirely uniform in this respect.See Church of Scientology of California & Founding Churches of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. Siegelman, No. 79 Civ. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. order dated Oct. 27, 1980) (“absence of any official connection” to Churches on the basis of evidence before the court prohibits compulsion of Hubbard as a witness), J.A. at 271-73.

8. We observe that other courts have reached inconsistent results in related cases concerning the managing-agent status of Hubbard in more recent years. Three decisions, relying on many of the same declarations and documentary evidence presented in this case, found that Hubbard could be deposed as a managing agent.Church of Scientology of California v. Armstrong, No. C420153 (Cal.Super.Ct. July 20, 1984), J.A. at 165-93;Church of Scientology of California v. Flynn, No. CV 83-5052R (C.D.Cal. Mar. 20, 1985) (finding Hubbard a managing agent through March 4, 1985), Supplemental Appendix (“S.A.”) at 729-30;Church of Scientology Int’l v. Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, No. CV 85-412T (W.D.N.Y. order dated Nov. 26, 1985), J.A. at 732-49. A fourth court, upholding the finding of a United States Magistrate, concluded that Hubbard could not be considered a managing agent for purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 30 after December 9, 1983.Religious Technology Center v. Scott, No. CV 85-711-MRP (C.D.Cal. order dated Jan. 24, 1986), J.A. at 773-75;see also n. 4,supra.

9. We recognize that a presumption of continuity in time may not hold as an absolute rule for relations of authority, see 9Wigmore on Evidence § 2530 (Chadbourn ed. 1981). “[T]he rulings merely declare that certain facts are admissible, or that they are sufficient evidence for the jury’s finding … on such issues….”Id. (citations omitted).

10. It cannot go unnoticed that these declarations were provided by individuals who owe their allegiance to an organization whose officials in the past have employed a number of devices, including deception and falsification, to achieve the organization’s goals. But needless to say, we are not in a position to weigh the veracity of the numerous declarants whose statements came before the District Court.

11. Rons Journal 38, as the later communication was known, took the form of a tape recording distributed to local Scientology Churches and Missions.See Transcript, transcribed December 18, 1984, J.A. at 355-93. In this message, apparently recorded on New Year’s Day 1984, Hubbard reported that he was making available “the first accurate briefing I have had on scientology organizations in several years.” J.A. at 356. The transcript suggests the way he continued to exercise such authority that amounted to control. He noted that he had not “[f]or a very long while … been connected” with the “demanding area” of “active management of the Church or associated organizations.”Id. Yet, as the reason for this separation, Hubbard contended that he needed time to “complete my researches and write them up for you,”id., an apparent reference to his pursuit of refinements in Scientology doctrine.See also J.A. at 391-92 (announcing “new discoveries”). In the bulk of the 37-page transcript, Hubbard recounted in great detail the latest changes in the Scientology organizations, with comprehensive statistics about the state of finances, the growth of the organization, and efforts by “new executives” in the organization to “rebuild global scientology in every division and sector, get it back on policy and in tech” after an alleged attempt by “power crazy people” to take over the organization. J.A. at 357-58. In this communication, Hubbard alluded to “Rev. 352,” or L.R.H. Ed. 352, J.A. at 358-59. In this statement from December 1983, Hubbard “gave an inkling” of the recent changes in the organization that Rons Journal 38 described in detail.

12. On January 27, 1986, over nine months after dismissal of this suit in the trial court, the Church announced that L. Ron Hubbard had died on January 24, 1986.See J.A. at 718 (citing account in WashingtonPost). As the parties have implicitly recognized, Hubbard’s passing has no bearing on the questions before us. We remain obligated to decide the appeal on the basis of the record before the District Court.

13. We are informed, without contradiction, that Scientologists uniformly agree that the writings of Hubbard comprise the sole source of their scriptures, a status equivalent to Judeo-Christian Scriptures.See Declaration of Heber Jentzsch, J.A. at 279; Yager Declaration, J.A. at 435-36; Lesevre Declaration, J.A. at 444; Church of Scientology,Scientology: A World Religion Emerges in the Space Age 52-55, District Court Exhibit 4(a)-A. As Rons Journal 38 suggests, Hubbard viewed even his most recent “new discoveries” as authoritative truth to be passed on as church doctrine. J.A. at 391-92. The great detail in which Hubbard recounted in Rons Journal 38 the status of the church organization and its membership also suggests that despite the declarations of Church officials, Hubbard’s role after 1982 may have encompassed at least some sort of advisory authority over the organization; the communications about “dissemination and delivery of Scientology religious services,” Lesevre Declaration at J.A. 446; Yager Declaration at J.A. 438, which the declarants have not submitted for the record or described in detail, suggests the same.

14. We are thus not confronted with a sudden or precipitous action by the District Court, but to the contrary a carefully calibrated course of action designed to further the progress of prolonged litigation. Nor are we faced with a situation where an innocent client may have suffered by virtue of the actions or omissions of an attorney. See, e.g., Shea v. Donohoe Constr. Co., supra; Butler v. Pearson, 636 F.2d 526 (D.C.Cir.1980); Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119 (D.C.Cir.1977).

15. Prior resort to lesser remedies is not in any event required regardless of the circumstances presented. Here, a clear order of the court was issued only after the party seeking discovery had been put to the test of demonstrating a need for the deposition. We emphasize the importance in our review of the care and deliberativeness evidenced by the District Court in moving to invoke a sanction, expressly authorized by the Rules, only after a crystal clear warning of the sanction to be imposed had been provided.

Notes

1. Retrieved on 8 September 2014 from http://www.leagle.com

Filed Under: Legal Tagged With: Anthony P. Bisceglie, Gerry Armstrong, Jeffrey B. O'Toole, L. Ron Hubbard, William C. Walsh

Michael Flynn v. CSI (August 28, 1986)

August 28, 1986 by Clerk1

 

Michael FLYNN, Plaintiff,
v.
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, et al., Defendants.
MBD No. 86-109.
United States District Court,
D. Massachusetts.
Aug. 28, 1986.
1

Defendant in civil action sought to compel deposition testimony of three persons and answers to deposition questions propounded to fourth person. The District Court, Joyce London Alexander, United States Magistrate, held that:

(1) plaintiff’s attorney and his wife, who was law office employee, were entitled to protection of attorney-client and work-product privileges, and any questions relating to their personal, fiduciary, and client financial records would be irrelevant, so deposition subpoena would be quashed and protective order granted; (2) assistant United States attorney assigned to ongoing criminal investigation and working with grand jury also could not be compelled to give deposition testimony and was protected under privilege for law enforcement investigative information and by criminal rule prohibiting disclosure of matters occuring before grand jury; and (3) member of law firm representing plaintiff had properly refused to answer deposition questions on grounds of lack of relevance and attorney-client and work-product privileges.

Ordered accordingly.

[1] WITNESSES
One who consults lawyer with view to obtaining professional legal services from him is regarded as client, for purposes of attorney-client privilege.

[2] WITNESSES
Communications from client to attorney are ordinarily privileged if they are legally related and have expectation of confidentiality.

[2] WITNESSES
Communications from client to attorney are ordinarily privileged if they are legally related and have expectation of confidentiality.

[3] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
Attorney’s work-product privilege protects against disclosure of his mental impressions, conclusion, opinions, or legal theories.

[4] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
Party seeking discovery of lawyer’s work product must establish adequate reasons to justify such production; when desired material can be obtained elsewhere, burden of showing such special circumstances has not been met.

[5] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
Attorney and his wife, who was his law office employee, were entitled to protection of attorney-client and work-product privileges in regard to deposition subpoena; discovery sought could be obtained by less intrusive sources, and even though defendants asserted that deposition focused on questions relating to attorney’s personal, fiduciary, and client financial records, those matters were irrelevant. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26, 28 U.S.C.A.

[6] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
Attorney fees for motion to quash deposition subpoena would not be awarded, absent evidence that opposition to that motion or subpoena itself was motivated by bad faith. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 37(a)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.

[7] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
Assistant United States attorney assigned to ongoing criminal investigation and working with grand jury could not be compelled to give deposition testimony in civil suit regarding matters that were subject of that investigation; possibility of disclosure of confidential information and sources in and of itself satisfied burden of showing applicability of privilege for law enforcement investigative information, and assertion of privilege against disclosure of matters before grand jury on question-by-question basis would involve possibility of risk of disclosure. Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule 6(e)(2), 18 U.S.C.A.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26, 28 U.S.C.A.

[8] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
Plaintiff’s attorney and another member of his law firm could refuse to answer deposition questions on grounds of lack of relevance and attorney-client and work-product privileges. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26, 28 U.S.C.A.
*2 Roger Geller, Geller & Weinberg, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

Ada Rose Bitterbaum, Flynn & Joyce, Boston, Mass., for defendants.

ORDER ON WITNESS WAYNE B. HOLLINGSWORTH AND JUNE L. HOLLINGSWORTH’S MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENAS, FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND FOR COSTS (# 21); BRACKETT B. DENNISTON’S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA (# 32); AND MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO DEPOSITION QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED TO DAVID BANASH

JOYCE LONDON ALEXANDER, United States Magistrate.

The present motions arise from an action in which plaintiff, Michael Flynn, seeks damages for emotional and economic injuries based on acts of the defendants. Plaintiff alleges that defendants published information concerning his alleged involvement in the unsuccessful attempt to pass a forged $2,000,000.00 check. [FN1]

FN1. Defendants’ Opposition to Motion of Deposition Witnesses Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June Hollingsworth to Quash Subpoenas and Protective Orders and Costs (# 26), p. 1-2.

Defendants, Church of Scientology (Scientology), seek to compel the deposition testimony of Wayne B. Hollingsworth, June L. Hollingsworth, Brackett Denniston III and the answers to deposition questions propounded to David Banash.

WAYNE AND JUNE HOLLINGSWORTH
Defendants subpoenaed Wayne and June Hollingsworth commanding them to provide deposition testimony. [FN2] Witnesses, Wayne B. Hollingsworth (Hollingsworth) and June L. Hollingsworth move to quash these deposition subpoenas. [FN3] They also seek protective orders and costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees.[FN4]

FN2. Witness, June L. Hollingsworth, was not served in hand with her deposition subpoena pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 45. Witness Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June L. Hollingsworth’s Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas for Protective Orders and For Costs (# 21), p. 1.

FN3. Id., (# 21), p. 1.

FN4. Id., (# 21), p. 1.

Hollingsworth is an attorney and since 1981 has represented the plaintiff against various individuals and entities related to Scientology. [FN5] As such, he asserts that the deposition subpoena should be quashed and protective order granted, because any information he has received concerning Scientology matters is covered by the attorney-client privilege or work product immunity within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26. [FN6]

FN5. Defendants’ Opposition to Motion of Deposition Witness Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June L. Hollingsworth to Quash Subpoenas for Protective Orders and Costs (# 26), p. 1.

FN6. Witness Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June L. Hollingsworth’s Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas for Protective Orders and for Costs (# 21), p. 2.

Defendants state that although Hollingsworth represented Flynn in litigation against Scientology, this is an insufficient basis to quash the deposition subpoena or grant a protective order. [FN7] Defendants further assert that they had no intention of questioning Hollingsworth on his actual representation of Flynn. Rather, the deposition will focus on areas for which no attorney-client privilege exists, such as Flynn’s physical appearance, non-legal *3 business affairs with deponent, or amount and sources of fees paid. [FN8]

FN7. Defendants’ Opposition to Motion of Deposition Witnesses Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June Hollingsworth to Quash Subpoenas and Protective Orders and Costs (# 26), p. 3.

FN8. Defendants’ Opposition to Motion of Deposition Witnesses Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June Hollingsworth to Quash Subpoenas and Protective Orders and Costs (# 26), p. 4.

Hollingsworth, who has represented the plaintiff in litigation against Scientology, [FN9] states that Scientology’s deposition subpoena is motivated by bad faith. He asserts that it is the defendant’s latest attempt to harass attorneys who represent or have represented the plaintiff by seeking privileged information from them. [FN10] Hollingsworth further asserts that defendants seek “irrelevant and first amendment privileged information” such as Hollingsworth’s personal, fiduciary and client financial records, that cannot lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. [FN11]

FN9. Defendant’s Opposition to Motion of Deposition Witnesses Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June Hollingsworth to Quash Subpoenas and Protective Orders and Costs (# 26), p. 1.

FN10. Hollingsworth provides that: Martin O’Malley, Paul Jenkins, Gary Pappas, Daniel Lenzo, Thomas Green and William Weld are other attorneys who were deposed. Witness Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June L.  Hollingsworth’s Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas, for Protective Order and for Costs (# 21), p. 2.

FN11. Id., (# 21), p. 2.

Defendants allege that there has been no showing of harassment, and the material sought is relevant and crucial to defendant’s defense. [FN12]

FN12. Defendants’ Opposition to Motion of Deposition Witnesses Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June Hollingsworth to Quash Subpoenas and for Protective Orders and Costs (# 25), p. 5.

[1][2] Cases show that one who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from him is regarded as a client for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. [FN13] Federal Practice & Procedure, Wright and Miller, Vol. 8, p. 135. Communications from a client to his attorney are ordinarily privileged if legally related and have an expectation of confidentiality. Duplan Corporation v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 370 F.Supp. 761, 768 (D.S.C.1972). “The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981).

FN13. “The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the Communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by client.” United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 358-359 (D.Mass.1950).

[3][4] An attorney’s work product privilege protects against the disclosure of his mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories. Mervin v. Federal Trade Commission, 591 F.2d 821, 825 (D.C.Cir.1978). The party seeking discovery of the lawyer’s “work-product” must establish adequate reasons to justify such production. When the desired material can be obtained elsewhere, the burden of showing such special circumstances has not been met. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-513, 67 S.Ct. 385, 393-394, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1946). It is axiomatic that Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) provides that only relevant matter may be the subject of discovery. “[W]here the relevance of information sought in discovery proceedings is questionable … discovery of the requested information will be denied.” Moore Federal Practice, Vol. 4, p. 26-431. *4 [5] The Court concludes that information concerning  Scientology matters which Hollingsworth has received is entitled to the protection of the attorney-client and work product privileges as a result of his representation of the plaintiff. The Court further concludes that discovery sought by defendants may be obtained by less intrusive sources than the intrusion of Hollingsworth’s work product.

In addition, the Court cannot find the requisite relevance of questions relating to Hollingsworth’s personal, fiduciary and client financial records to the case sub judice. As such, the Court concludes that such information cannot lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. Witness June L. Hollingsworth is the wife of Wayne B. Hollingsworth. [FN14] Mrs. Hollingsworth asserts that since 1981 she was employed by her husband’s law firm. [FN15] She submits that her deposition should be quashed and a protective order granted in that she has no knowledge of any relevant facts that are not privileged. [FN16]

FN14. Witness Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June L. Hollingsworth’s Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas for Protective Order and for Costs (# 21), p. 3.

FN15. Id., (# 21), p. 3.

FN16. Id., (# 21), p. 3.

Defendants state that the deposition testimony of Mrs. Hollingsworth, as an employee of Hollingsworth’s law office, is calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. [FN17]

FN17. Defendant’s Opposition to Motion of Deposition Witnesses Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June Hollingsworth to Quash Subpoena and for Protective Orders and for Costs (# 26), p. 1.

The Court has concluded that Mr. Hollingsworth has properly asserted both attorney-client and work product privileges. [FN18] “[C]onfidences imputed to the attorney are presumed shared among his partners and employees associated with him….” State of Arkansas v. Dean Foods Products Company, 605 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir.1979).

FN18. Witness Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June Hollingsworth’s Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas, for Protective Order and for Costs (# 21), p. 2.

This Court finds that as an employee of the law firm which represented the plaintiff, any privileges asserted by Mr. Hollingsworth extend to June Hollingsworth, and any relevant information she may have acquired is protected. Consonant with the foregoing, Wayne B. Hollingsworth and June Hollingsworth’s Motions to quash and for protective orders are hereby ALLOWED.

[6] Wayne and June Hollingsworth also seek costs including reasonable attorney’s fees as a part of their motion before the Court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4) provides:

“If the motion is granted, the court shall … require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion … to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney’s fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” The Court cannot conclude that defendants’ opposition to Wayne and June Hollingsworth’s motions to quash were substantially unjustified or motivated by bad faith. Nor can this Court find that Wayne Hollingsworth has provided sufficient information to substantiate his claim that the deposition subpoena was motivated by bad faith. Accordingly, the Court denies the Hollingsworth’s request for attorney’s fees and costs.

BRACKETT DENNISTON III
[7] On April 9, 1986, defendants subpoenaed Brackett B. Denniston III (Denniston), commanding him to appear and give deposition testimony. [FN19] Denniston now moves to quash the subpoena. [FN20]

FN19. Motion to Quash Subpoena (# 32), p. 1.

FN20. Motion to Quash Subpoena (# 32), p. 1.

*5 Denniston, an Assistant United States Attorney, states that he is assigned to an ongoing criminal investigation of matters about which Scientology seeks to take his deposition. He is also working with a Grand Jury on these matters. [FN21]

FN21. Bracket Denniston is Chief of the Major Frauds Unit of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena (# 33), p. 1.

Denniston asserts that the subpoena should be quashed because his testimony is not authorized by the Department of Justice. Denniston submits that federal regulations prohibit him, as an employee of the Department of Justice, from disclosing information based on material contained in the files of the Department, without prior approval of the proper Department official. [FN22]

FN22. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena (# 33), p. 3. 28 C.F.R. s 16.22(a) General prohibition of production or disclosure in Federal and State proceedings in which the United States is not a party, provides:

“In any federal or state case or matter in which the United States is not a party, no employee or former employee of the Department of Justice shall, in response to a demand, produce any material contained in the files of the Department, or disclose any information relating to or based upon material contained in the files of the Department, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of the performance of that person’s official status without prior approval of the proper Department official….”

At the hearing, it was stated that after discussing this matter with U.S. Attorney Weld, Denniston was denied authority to testify. Denniston states that such denial was proper. [FN23]

FN23. Denniston submits that compliance with a subpoena will not be allowed if disclosure would reveal a confidential source or informant or would interfere with enforcement proceedings. Denniston asserts that compulsion of his testimony would seriously compromise the ongoing criminal investigation and would reveal confidential sources of information, and thus the denial of authorization was proper. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena (# 33), p. 4.

Defendants stated at the hearing that the U.S. Attorney’s denial of Denniston’s authorization to testify is not a final determination. Rather, the decision is reviewable by the Court. The Court concludes that the U.S. Attorney’s denial of Denniston’s authorization to testify was proper. [FN24]

FN24. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena (# 33), p. 3.

Denniston submits that the subpoena calls for privileged matter from an ongoing criminal investigation. [FN25] Denniston states that any information he has stems solely from his criminal investigation on behalf of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Such information is protected under the privilege for law enforcement investigative information. [FN26]

FN25. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena (# 33), p. 4.

FN26. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena (# 33), p. 4.

Defendants submit that the government has the burden of demonstrating the applicability of its asserted privilege, and the government has not met its burden of showing how the deposition will impede the ongoing criminal investigation. [FN27]

FN27. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Attendance of Witness at Deposition and Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoena of Brackett B. Denniston III (# 38), p. 13-14.

The Court notes that “there is indeed a public interest in minimizing disclosure of documents that would tend to reveal law enforcement investigative techniques or sources.” Black v. Sheraton Corporation of America, 564 F.2d 531, 545 (D.C.Cir.1977). “It is well established that the government has a qualified privilege to prevent public disclosure of investigative files and related material prepared in the course of an ongoing criminal investigation.” Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 493 (E.D.Mich.1977). The Court finds that the possibility of disclosure of confidential information and sources is enough in and of itself to satisfy Denniston’s burden of showing the applicability of the privilege asserted.

Denniston further submits that compelling his testimony would violate Fed.R. *6 Crim.P. 6(e), which prohibits disclosure of matters before the Grand Jury. [FN28]

FN28. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena (# 33), p. 5-6.

Defendants assert that they do not seek to question Denniston about grand jury testimony, and further, such information may be protected by Denniston’s opportunity to assert the privilege if necessary. [FN29]

FN29. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Attendance of Witness at Deposition and Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoena of Bracket B. Denniston III (# 38), p. 21.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(2) provides that, “… an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made … shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury….”

The Court finds that allowing the privilege to be asserted on a question-by-question basis involves the possibility of the risk of disclosure. As such, to assure the secrecy and nondisclosure of the investigation before the grand jury the Court concludes that Denniston’s assertion of Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(2) is proper.

For the reasons stated above, Brackett B. Denniston III’s Motion to Quash Subpoena is hereby ALLOWED.

DAVID BANASH
[8] Defendants move to compel David Banash (Banash) to answer certain deposition questions propounded to him which he refused to answer during his deposition on March 12, 1986. [FN30]

FN30. Banash’s refusal to answer certain deposition questions was based on three grounds: a) lack of relevance; b) attorney-client privilege; and c) attorney work product. Motion to Compel Answers to Deposition Questions Propounded to David Banash, p. 1-3.

In support of their motion to compel, the defendants make the following proffers:

First, defendants state that Banash’s objections based on the grounds of relevancy are without merit. They assert that all information sought is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and should thus be provided. [FN31]

FN31. Motion to Compel Answers to Deposition Questions Propounded to David Banash, p. 5.

Next, defendants assert that Banash’s objections based on the attorney-client privilege are also without merit, in that Banash has failed to meet his burden in demonstrating how the questions propounded interfere with his attorney-client relationship. [FN32]

FN32. Motion to Compel Answers to Deposition Questions Propounded to David Banash, p. 10.

Finally, defendants submit that Banash’s failure to answer questions on Hollingsworth’s “physical and emotional demeanor” is without merit, because physical appearance is not a privileged matter. [FN33]

FN33. Id., p. 14.

As to the first contention, Banash submits that his refusal to answer certain questions on the grounds of relevancy was proper. [FN34] At hearing, counsel for Banash asserted that defendants were asking for broad and irrelevant discovery of Mr. Hollingsworth, who is not even a party in this case. [FN35]

FN34. Plaintiff and Deponent’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel Answers to Deposition Questions Propounded to David Banash, p. 4.

FN35. Counsel for Banash stated that questions such as: How Hollingsworth billed his clients; questions relating to Hollingsworth’s personal finances, personal habits, friendships and relations, have no relevance to the allegations about the plaintiff in the case. Plaintiff and Deponent’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Answers to Deposition Questions Propounded to David Banash, p. 6.

Banash next states that he is an attorney and was not only a member of Hollingsworth’s law firm, but he has also represented both the plaintiff and Mr. Hollingsworth. [FN36] Banash states that he has also provided legal advice to Mr. Hollingsworth and advised him regarding his rights *7 against Scientology. [FN37] At hearing, counsel for Banash asserted that Banash has represented Hollingsworth and the plaintiff during the relevant time periods for which defendant’s seek Banash’s deposition. Counsel stated that this is enough in itself to show that Banash has met the burden of demonstrating an interference with his attorney-client relationship if compelled to answer
questions which may relate to this representation. As such, Banash asserts that his objections based on the attorney-client privilege were proper. [FN38]

FN36. Plaintiff and Deponent’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Answers to Deposition Questions Propounded to David Banash, p. 2.

FN37. Id.

FN38. Plaintiff and Deponent’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Answers to Deposition Questions Propounded to David Banash, p. 3.

Finally, Banash asserts that the information sought based on his observations and impressions of Hollingsworth were properly refused and are protected by his work product privilege. [FN39] At hearing, counsel for Banash submitted that there is a distinction between the objective physical observation, which defendants are entitled to, such as information based on a client’s height, weight, clothes, and the subjective physical observation, such as information related to the clients distress, which is clearly protected. [FN40] Banash further states that information protected by the work product doctrine may only be reached where there is inability to obtain it otherwise. [FN41]

FN39. Banash states that the work product doctrine is reflected in Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3) and it protects an attorney’s mental impressions, thought processes and personal beliefs concerning a case. Plaintiff and Deponent’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel Answers to Deposition Questions Propounded to David Banash, p. 14-15.

FN40. Counsel stated that an attorney’s subjective physical observation of his client is impossible to distinguish from the privileged work product mental impressions that an attorney uses to decide how to handle a case, and thus, subjective physical observation is clearly protected.

FN41. Banash submits that there are numerous sources from which defendants can obtain information about the plaintiff’s damages without requiring an attorney to reveal his work product. This includes: plaintiff’s family; non-lawyer colleagues; friends; and the deposing of the plaintiff himself. Plaintiff’s and deponent’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel Answers to Deposition Questions Propounded to David Banash, p. 17.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) provides that only relevant matter may be the subject of discovery. “[W]here the relevance of information sought in discovery proceedings is questionable and the request is overly broad, or compliance with such a request would be unduly burdensome, discovery of the requested information will be denied.” Moore’s Federal Practice, Vol. 4, p. 26-431. Under a generous reading of the defendant’s memoranda, this Court is unable to find the relevance of the information sought. [FN42] Accordingly, the Court finds that Banash’s refusal to answer deposition questions on the grounds of relevancy was proper.

FN42. The Court may deny motion to compel further deposition questioning when the Court determines questions are irrelevant. Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Westrope, 730 F.2d 729, 732 (11th Cir.1984).

The Court also finds that Banash’s refusal to answer deposition questions on the grounds of attorney-client and work product privileges were proper. The Court concludes this based on the same reasoning as cited above in the Hollingsworth order.

Consonant with the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Answers to Deposition Questions Propounded to David Banash is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Notes

  1. Retrieved on September 27, 2014 from http://www.xenu.net/archive/CourtFiles/occf124.html. ↩︎

Filed Under: Legal Tagged With: Brackett B. Denniston III, Check Forgery Frame, David Banash, June L. Hollingsworth, Michael Flynn v. Scientology, Michael J. Flynn, Wayne B. Hollingsworth

Lowell Sun: Charges of scheme to bilk church of $2M take new twist (August 22, 1986)

August 22, 1986 by Clerk1

Charges of scheme to bilk church of $2M take new twist
by Raymond Howell

BOSTON — An international con artist has been charged in a scheme to bilk the controversial Church of Scientology out of $2 million, adding a new layer of intrigue to a Byzantine case that already involves a reputed organized crime figure, a disbarred lawyer and a financial swindler-turned-FBI-Informant.

Ala Fadili Al Tamimi, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), was arraigned Tuesday in U.S. District Court in connection with the scam against L. Ron Hubbard, the late and reclusive Scientology founder. He pleaded innocent and was detained without bail.

Last May, reputed organized crime figure George T. Kattar of Methuen and disbarred attorney Harvey Brower of Swampscott were indicted on charges of offering the church false information about the scam in exchange for a $100,000 fee. Both are free on bail.

Kattar and Brower were implicated by Larry Reservitz, a disbarred Brockton lawyer, high-rolling gambler and convicted financial swindler who participated in the second alleged fraud as an informant for the FBI. He is in the federal witness protection program.

Extradited from Germany

Tamimi, 34, was indicted in the $2 million scheme last November. But at the time, he was serving a prison sentence in Germany for a fraud in that country. He was extradited last Friday.

Also indicted in the case was Tamimi’s brother, Akil Abdul Amir Al Fadili Al Tamimi. But Akil Tamimi is believed to be in the UAE, which does not have an extradition treaty with the U.S., according to Assistant U.S. Attorney Gary Crossen.

A federal grand jury continues to investigate the $2 million scam. “Our belief is there are other conspirators and there is therefore an ongoing grand jury investigation,” Crossen said yesterday.

Harry L. Manion III, a church attorney and spokesman, said: “Church officials wonder why at this point Ala Tamimi’s co-conspirators have not also been indicted.

“The church will press on to expose this conspiracy wherever the web of the conspiracy may lead and to expose whoever may be caught up in it,” he said.

Ala Tamimi also faces trial on fraud charges stemming from his dealings as president of a company called First Boston Arabian Corporation in 1981.

Promised lavish loans

The company purported to find Arab shieks willing to make lavish loans at low interest rates to real estate developers and other businessmen in the U.S.

Tamimi required borrowers to pay him advance finder’s fees, but he had neither loan commitments nor funds, the government charges.

His clients included a German national named Wolfgang Jurgens, for whom Tamlmi purportedly arranged a $75 million loan.

Tamimi’s fee was $2.5 million and he allegedly demanded $870,000 in advance of the closing. Jurgens paid it in the form of 1.7 million German Deutschmarks, two Mercedes-Benzes, two BMWs, $12,000 in U.S. currency and an $8,000 Rolex watch.

Tamimi was indicted in the First Boston Arabian case in March 1983. But in June of that year, he jumped bail.

Shortly afterward, he was arrested for fraud in Sicily, according to an FBI affidavit and Tamimi’s attorney, John C. McBride of Boston.

Tamimi spent two and a half years in an Italian jail. Upon his release, he was transferred to Germany, where he was wanted for fraud and where he ended up serving nine months in jail, according to McBride.

In March 1984, while he was incarcerated abroad, Tamimi was secretly indicted for perjury in connection with statements he made in court before he jumped bail in the first Boston Arabian case.

Court documents indicate that during bail hearings in that case, Tamimi claimed to have two passports — one from Jordan and another from the U.S. Both were eventually turned over to authorities.

But it was later learned that he possessed two other U.S. passports and used one of them in Italy, according to an FBI affidavit.

Tamimi cannot be tried on the perjury indictment, however, because the extradition agreement with Germany does not include that charge, said Crossen.

The German government was “disinclined to extradite hint based on the perjury indictment,” the prosecutor said.

It was also during his incarceration abroad that Tamimi was secretly indicted in the Scientology scheme.

The two-count indictment, returned Nov. 22, 1985, accuses Tamimi and his brother of conspiracy and interstate transportation of conterfeit checks.

It alleges that in May 1982, they obtained a $2 million forged check drawn on an account of Hubbard and a $500,000 counterfeit check drawn on an account of a company called Indian River Foods Inc. Both accounts were at the Bank of New England in Boston.

The indictment further alleges that in June 1982, they transported the checks from Massachusetts to New York and attempted to deposit them in the Middle East Bank Ltd., where Akil Tamimi had opened an account under the alias of Aquii Abdulamiar.

Suspecting that something was wrong, bank officials raised questions about the check and did not cash it.

Attorney McBride said yesterday: “We’re going the whole route. The government can’t prove its case.”

Referring to the fact that the check was never cashed, he said: “The church was never defrauded out of any money. Mr. Hubbard never lost any money.”

Although Tamimi had not been formally charged in the Hubbard check case until Tuesday, he has been linked to it as far back as 1984.

At that time, a private investigator hired by the church, Eugene Ingram, visited Tamimi in jail in Italy and brought back an affidavit in which Tamimi implicated himself and Boxford attorney Michael Flynn. The affidavit was turned over to the FBI and has been cited in civil litigation involving the church.

Flynn, who has been battling the church for years in numerous civil suits, has vigorously denied any involvement in the scam, denied knowing Tamimi and accused Scientology officials or trying to smear him.

Flynn was out of town and unavailable for comment yesterday, but an associate, Mike Tabb, said Tamimi has since sent telegrams to Flynn stating that the portion of the affidavit about Flynn is untrue.

Tabb also claimed that Ingram has been investigated by a grand jury for possibly having “procurred perjury” from Tamimi.

“From our investigation, it appears that Mr. Tamimi was involved in the Hubbard check, but Mike Flynn had no involvement in that,” Tabb added. “…The government has never indicated that Michael Flynn is a target of a grand jury investigation or that he is seriously considered a suspect.”

McBride, when asked about his client’s affidavit, said Tamimi has since disavowed it. He also claimed that the Justice Department has “publicly” rejected the “credibility” of the affidavit.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Crossen said the government has not made any public declarations about the credibility of the affidavit. But he refused to comment further on it.

The names of Flynn and Tamimi have begun to surface in court documents filed in the case of Kattar and Brower, who allegedly schemed to bilk the church in 1984.

In two handwriting exemplars filed by Kattar’s attorney, Michael Avery, during discovery proceedings, Kattar mentions Flynn and Tamimi as having been involved in the original check scheme.

The handwriting exemplars were requested by a grand jury in January 1988, along with photographs and fingerprints of Kattar, Avery said in an affidavit. Presumably, they were requested so they could be compared to identically worded notes already in the grand jury’s possession.

Noting that Kattar and Brower have been accused of fabricating a story about the $2 million scam, Tabb claimed the notes represented “the false story that Kattar told.”

Tabb also pointed to an FBI affidavit which quotes certain conversations involving Kattar and Brower. In the narrative, the affidavit says: “In essence, they decided to falsely accuse several persons of complicity in the check offense, including a Boston lawyer (Michael Flynn).”

Neither Assistant U.S. Attorney Crossen nor Avery, Kattar’s attorney, would comment on the handwriting exemplars.

Notes

Retrieved September 24, 2014 from http://www.xenu-directory.net/news/library-item.php?iid=3133

Filed Under: Media articles Tagged With: Ala Fadili Al Tamimi, Aquil Abdul Amiar, Check Forgery Frame, George T. Kattar, Harry L. Manion III, Harvey Brower, Larry J. Reservitz, Michael Avery, Michael J. Flynn, Mike Tabb

GA Letter to FBI (August 13, 1986)

August 13, 1986 by Clerk1

Law Offices
FLYNN, JOYCE & SHERIDAN
400 ATLANTIC AVENUE
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02210
———
(617)350-7200

MICHAEL J. FLYNN
ROBERT W. JOYCE, P.C.
WILLIAM A. SHERIDAN
MICHAEL A. TABB
August 13, 1986
 

Federal Bureau of Investigation
John F. Kennedy Building
Government Center
Boston, MA 02203

 
ga-ltr-fbi-1986-08-13
GA letter to FBI (August 13, 1986)

Re: Gerald Armstrong
Your file no. 47-4569

Dear Sir/Madam:

Enclosed please find a copy of a declaration I wrote regarding my contact with an individual named Mitra Hall who had in October 1985 filed a false complaint against me with the Boston FBI.1

I am aware that Assistant US Attorney Victor Wild, to whom the matter was referred at the time, stated that he would decline prosecution. Nevertheless, I wish to ensure that your file is complete, so I am forwarding this declaration.

  Very truly yours,

[Signed] G. Armstrong
Gerald Armstrong

GA/
enclosure

Notes

  1. See Declaration of Gerald Armstrong (August 12, 1986) ↩︎

Filed Under: Correspondence Tagged With: FBI, Gerry Armstrong, Impersonation, Mitra Hall

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